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This Article seeks what may be the holy grail of securities law scholarship—
the role of the “merits” in securities class actions—by investigating the relation-
ship between settlements and directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance.  
Drawing upon in-depth interviews with plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers, D&O 
insurance claims managers, monitoring counsel, brokers, mediators, and testi-
fying experts, we elucidate the key factors influencing settlement and examine 
the relationship between these factors and notions of merit in civil litigation.  
We find that, although securities settlements are influenced by some factors that 
are arguably merit related, such as the “sex appeal” of a claim’s liability ele-
ments, they are also influenced by many that are not, including, most obvi-
ously, the amount and structure of D&O insurance.  The virtual absence of 
adjudication results in payment to the plaintiffs’ class for every claim surviving 
the motions stage and, as importantly, a lack of authoritative guidance about 
merit at settlement.  Without such adjudication, the weight of various factual 
patterns is untested, and the validity of competing damages models remains 
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unknown.  Parties structure their settlement by reference to other settlements, but 
these are opaque and subject to the same set of distortions.  In this murky envi-
ronment, plaintiffs and defendants collude to pressure the D&O insurer to settle 
on terms that may not reflect the ultimate merits of the claim.  More adjudica-
tion, we argue, would be the best solution to the problem, but barring that, dis-
closure of D&O insurance and settlement terms would offer some improvement. 
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................756
I. SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LAW AND PROCEDURE ...................763
A. Substantive Law ...................................................................764
B. Procedural Stages ..................................................................769
1. Investigation and Filing ..........................................769
2. Class Certification and Lead Plaintiff Selection ....771
3. The Motion to Dismiss, Discovery,  
and Settlement ........................................................775
II. WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT MERITS .............779
III. FIELD RESEARCH ON SETTLING SHAREHOLDER 
CLASS ACTIONS..............................................................................783
A. Liability and Damages in Securities Settlements ......................785
1. Liability....................................................................786
2. Damages ..................................................................791
B. The Role of D&O Insurance in the Settlement Process .............796
1. Limits.......................................................................804
2. Layers.......................................................................809
a. The Arrangement of the Tower..........................810
b. Firebreaks ........................................................813
C. Other Incentives:  Defendants and Counsel.............................816
IV. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................820
A. More Adjudication ................................................................823
B. More Disclosure.....................................................................827
C. Less Entity-Level D&O Insurance..........................................830
CONCLUSION..........................................................................................831
INTRODUCTION
In an article announcing the retirement of Bill Lerach, the fa-
mous and widely reviled plaintiffs’ lawyer, the Wall Street Journal con-
cisely summarized the debate surrounding securities class actions.  On 
one side, the reporter wrote, are those who claim securities class ac-
tions force defendant corporations to settle “regardless of the underly-
ing merits of the claim,” and on the other are those who argue that 
such lawsuits “help keep corporate America accountable” by detect-
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ing, punishing, and deterring fraud.1  Lerach, the newspaper sug-
gested, was that controversy personified.2  But the controversy is much 
bigger than one man, and it has hardly been put to rest. 
The question, as it was powerfully framed by Janet Cooper Alex-
ander, is do the merits matter in the settlement of securities class ac-
tions?3  In other words, do the merits of claims determine the 
amounts paid at settlement, or are they essentially irrelevant?  Alexan-
der’s answer was that the merits do not matter.4  Her argument played 
an important role in changing the law, providing rhetorical support 
and academic credibility to interest groups lobbying to make securi-
ties class actions more difficult for plaintiffs to bring—an endeavor 
that succeeded in 1995 with the enactment of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).5  Indeed, Alexander’s article is still 
widely cited even though its empirical foundation has been under-
mined,6 perhaps because her basic claim—that the merits do not mat-
ter in securities litigation—is so widely believed.7
1 Nathan Koppel, Milberg Figure Lerach Retires Amid Plea Talks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 
2007, at B2. 
2 Id.  Others have suggested as much, often with less restraint.  See, e.g., Karen 
Donovan, Bloodsucking Scumbag, WIRED, Nov. 1996, at 134, 136-37 (describing Lerach’s 
role in securities class actions against high-technology companies). 
3 Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?  A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991). 
4 See id. at 500 (noting that “a strong case . . . appears to have been worth no more 
than a weak one”); id. at 597 (concluding that “[s]ettlements that do not reflect the 
merits therefore may be typical of securities class actions generally”). 
5 See Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 & 18 U.S.C.).  On the influence of Professor Alexander’s article, see 
generally William S. Lerach, “The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995—27 
Months Later”:  Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act’s Brave New World, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 598 (1998), which notes that Congress 
“relied heavily upon Professor Janet Cooper Alexander’s article” in enacting the 
PSLRA.
6 See James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV.
497, 503-04 (1997) (arguing that the damages estimates supporting Alexander’s core 
thesis had been calculated incorrectly); Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the 
Money Do the Monitoring:  How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities 
Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2083-84 (1995) (recalculating potential damages for 
the lawsuits in Alexander’s sample and finding much more variation, thereby destroy-
ing the support of Alexander’s core assertion); see also Leonard B. Simon & William S. 
Dato, Legislating on a False Foundation:  The Erroneous Academic Underpinnings of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 990-93 (1996) (critiqu-
ing Alexander’s methodology and deeming her analysis “unconvincing”). 
7 Alexander’s Do the Merits Matter?, supra note 3, was published in February 1991.  
Based on our February 27, 2008, Westlaw search, Alexander’s article was cited in 11 
court cases, 143 law review articles, and 23 appellate filings or briefs—or 177 times in 
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Because the merits question is now so loaded—taking a firm posi-
tion on it is like declaring a political allegiance or picking a fight—
researchers approach it with considerably more caution.8  Their re-
sults, not surprisingly, are ambiguous.  Studies since the PSLRA have 
found that securities lawsuits are now more often dismissed, but the 
additional dismissals may include meritorious and nonmeritorious 
suits alike, therefore leaving researchers unable to conclude that only 
the meritorious survive.9  Securities claims now take longer to settle, 
perhaps suggesting that plaintiffs’ lawyers are bringing better claims 
and pushing them harder,10 and claims featuring easily identifiable 
indicia of wrongdoing or fraud—such as earnings restatements, in-
sider selling, and concomitant regulatory investigations—settle higher 
than claims without such features.11  Insofar as such indicia correlate 
with the merits of a securities claim,12 these studies may support the 
total—from June 1992 to June 1997.  Although the frequency of cites has declined over 
time, her article was still cited in 3 cases, 76 law reviews, and in 26 appellate filings or 
briefs—105 times in total—between 2003 and 2008. 
8 We are a case in point.  In a prior article, Griffith assumes that the merits matter 
to some degree in arguing for mandatory disclosure of D&O insurance information.  
See Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper:  Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of De-
tails Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 
1161 (2006) (“[T]he total cost of shareholder litigation depends, at least in part, on 
corporate wrongdoing . . . .”).  Similarly, after finding that D&O insurers do weigh 
merits-related factors in their underwriting decisions, we concluded that that “the mer-
its somewhat matter.”  Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk:  
Evidence from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 
538 (2007). 
9 See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 
1498 (2004) (“[T]he existing literature on filings and settlements in the post-PSLRA 
time period provide[s] evidence that frivolous suits existed prior to the PSLRA and 
that a shift occurred in the post-PSLRA period toward more meritorious claims.”); 
Jonathan C. Dickey & Marcia Kramer Mayer, Effect on Rule 10b-5 Damages of the 1995 Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act:  A Forward-Looking Assessment, 51 BUS. LAW. 1203, 
1219 (1996) (concluding that reduced damages after the PSLRA may deter the filing 
of suits “that would have been brought under the prior law”). 
10 See Denise N. Martin et al., Recent Trends IV:  What Explains Filings and Settlements 
in Shareholder Class Actions, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 123 (1999) (acknowledging 
that “the timing of settlements may indeed be reflective of a case’s merits” and that 
“only a portion of low-valued settlements are likely to be nuisance suit settlements”). 
11 See Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More?  The Impact of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 630 (2007) (finding “a signifi-
cantly greater correlation between litigation and both earnings restatements and ab-
normal insider selling after the PSLRA”). 
12 As the studies’ authors acknowledge, the correlation will not be perfect.  Some 
meritorious claims will lack hard evidence, and some hard evidence may not point to 
actual fraud. See id. at 649 (“[L]awyers may be unable to prove some meritorious 
claims under the rigorous constraints imposed by the PSLRA.”). 
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proposition that at least some meritorious claims settle higher than 
nonmeritorious claims.13  But, as the researchers acknowledge, the 
correlation is far from perfect—some fraudulent conduct will not 
leave behind such a tangible trace—preventing us from drawing a 
strong conclusion about the merits of securities claims. 
In this Article, we confront the issue of merits in securities class 
actions.14  But we do not ask whether the merits matter.  Our question, 
instead, is how the merits matter.  How do the participants in securities 
class actions understand the merits, and how do they talk about them?  
How do they use the idea of merit in settlement negotiations?  And 
what do they view the role of merit to be in shaping outcomes at set-
tlement?
Because our research question is qualitative—asking how the set-
tlement process works—our research methods are also qualitative, not 
quantitative.15  Our basic tool is the semistructured interview, in which 
13 For a discussion on how the merits affect settlement amounts, see infra Part III.A. 
14 Throughout this Article, we are dealing with the “fat middle” of securities class 
actions—i.e., those that are not too big and not too small.  Researchers have shown 
that extremely small claims—those settling in the $2 million to $3 million range—are 
more likely to be nuisance claims.  See James D. Cox et al., There Are Plaintiffs and . . . 
There Are Plaintiffs:  An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 355, 383 (finding that small settlements exhibit qualities associated with strike 
suits).  Similarly, the largest cases—those resulting in “megasettlements” of $300 mil-
lion or more—differ systematically from those that are settled within or close to D&O 
insurance limits.  As one defense counsel put it, 
[I]n a case that is going to go for $5 million, . . . usually the parties get to-
gether and say, you know, “Look, we should wrap this case up.  It’s not that big 
a case.  I know you think it is.”  And you know that kind of thing happens, but 
in the bigger cases, it is just more complicated.  
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Defense Counsel #5, at 
12 (May 23, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [hereinafter D&O 
Interviews, Defense Counsel #5]; see also id., Interview with Claims Head #9, at 15-17 
( July 10, 2007) [hereinafter D&O Interviews, Claims Head #9] (noting that large set-
tlements “bring in a lot of profits to yourself and the firm, a lot of name recognition 
and high profile, and as a result there’s a lot attached, and the defense counsel who 
can stand above that and settle early is overcoming a lot of pressures,” and that 
“[t]here’s both psychological and career motivational factors to do otherwise”).  For 
our purposes, the paradigmatic securities class action is one that settles for more than 
$2 million but either less than or not much more than total D&O insurance limits. 
15 Qualitative research employs field interviews and other sociological techniques 
to develop thick descriptions of a problem area.  See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Com-
mercial Law in the Cotton Industry:  Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institu-
tions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1725 (2001) (relying “on a detailed case study of contrac-
tual relations in the cotton industry to examine the ways that the rules, norms, and 
institutions that constitute the industry’s [private legal system] create value for transac-
tors”).  We are not critics of quantitative research, but the use of regressions to show 
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we ask questions, but also allow our participants simply to talk, to de-
scribe the settlement process in their own words, and to illustrate their 
explanations with stories and anecdotes.16  During 2006 and 2007, we 
interviewed over fifty people involved in the process of settling securi-
ties claims, including plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers, claims managers 
at directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance companies, insur-
ers’ monitoring counsel, claims-side brokers, mediators, and testifying 
experts.17  In addition, we read their trade literature and participated 
in industry conferences.  In short, we entered the field in an effort to 
understand it from the perspectives of those working within it.18
A principal focus of our research was the role of D&O liability in-
surance.  D&O insurance covers losses that corporations and their di-
rectors and officers incur in connection with corporate and securities 
litigation.19  Virtually all U.S. public corporations buy D&O insur-
whether a particular variable is relevant requires an a priori theory of how something 
works, which then determines what kinds of data ought to be tested.  We are asking the 
how question, not the whether question. 
16 Pursuant to research protocols approved by the Institutional Review Boards of 
the University of Connecticut and Fordham University, we interviewed the participants 
under a promise of confidentiality.  The interviews were recorded and transcribed, and 
participant-identifying information was removed from the transcripts. Copies of the 
redacted transcripts have been provided to the editors of the University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review for verification. 
17 These interviews build upon an initial round of forty-eight interviews of direc-
tors’ and officers’ liability insurance professionals conducted in connection with our 
prior research.  Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 493.  We describe the interviews and 
their selection at the beginning of Part III of this Article. 
18 Legal scholarship of this kind dates back to the Legal Realists, most notably 
Roscoe Pound and Karl Llewellyn.  Cf. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:
HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (finding, primarily through field interviews, 
that neighbors in Shasta County, California, resolve most conflicts through the use of 
informal norms, rather than formal legal rules).  Intensive qualitative research has 
long been the hallmark of anthropologists and much of sociology, and even of some 
scholars working within a law-and-economics framework, particularly in recent years.  
See, e.g., RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE (2003) (offering a 
sociological investigation of the insurance industry); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, COLONIZING 
HAWAI’I: THE CULTURAL POWER OF LAW (2000) (presenting an anthropological inves-
tigation of the role of law in colonization); H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF 
COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS (1970) (providing a 
sociological investigation of automobile law in action); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the 
Legal System:  Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
115 (1992) (describing the private legal system at work in the diamond industry); 
Bernstein, supra note 15 (examining, through a detailed case study of the cotton in-
dustry, how private legal systems can reduce costs). 
19 Policies cover not only losses incurred by individual directors and officers, but 
also losses incurred by the corporation itself in defending and settling securities 
claims.  A typical policy excludes adjudication of “actual fraud,” but pays for judgments 
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ance,20 and the vast majority of securities claims settle within or just 
above the limits of the defendant corporation’s D&O coverage.21  As a 
result, it is not a stretch to assert that the principal party at interest in 
most securities class actions is the D&O insurer.  Our research focused 
largely on uncovering the interests of this party, in discovering how it 
understands “merit,” and how these interests and understandings in-
fluence the settlement of securities litigation. 
In emphasizing the centrality of liability insurance in determining 
substantive legal outcomes, this Article continues a theme from our 
prior work, and indeed it may be viewed as the conclusion of a trilogy 
where the defendants meet the lower standard of reasonableness.  Policies typically 
cover amounts paid in settlement as well as defense costs.  Because virtually all securi-
ties class actions settle without adjudication, the exclusion of “actual fraud” typically 
does not affect payment obligations, and it is not an overstatement to assert that D&O 
policies cover all losses typically incurred by corporations in connection with securities 
litigation.  See Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 499-501 (describing important facets of 
the coverage offered by D&O policies). 
20 See TOWERS PERRIN, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY: 2006 SURVEY OF IN-
SURANCE PURCHASING AND CLAIMS TRENDS 25 exhibit 29 (2006), available at
http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?webc=HRS/USA/2007/200704/ 
DO_Survey_Report2006_040507.pdf (reporting that 91% of public-company respon-
dents in the United States purchased entity coverage).  The annual Towers Perrin 
D&O survey is based on a nonrandom, self-selecting sample of companies.  It is also 
the only systematic source of information on D&O insurance purchasing patterns in 
the United States.  We therefore draw upon it as a source of aggregate data despite its 
methodological weaknesses. 
21 According to the Towers Perrin data, the size of the average D&O policy ranges 
from approximately $20 million in limits for small-cap companies to over $195 million 
in limits for large-cap companies.  Id. at 17 exhibit 13.  At the same time, average D&O 
settlements range from less than $10 million for the majority of settlements to more 
than $100 million for the most expensive 11% of cases.  See STEPHANIE PLANCICH ET 
AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITI-
GATION 9-11 (2007), available at http://www.nera.com/image/BRO_Recent_Trends 
_Dec07_0708_final.pdf (reporting that average settlements—excluding those over $1 
billion—increased from $22.7 million in 2006 to $33.2 million in 2007, and noting that 
including settlements over $1 billion would raise the 2007 average to $40.2 million); 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2006 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 33, 36-37 (2007), 
available at http://www.pwc.com/images/us/eng/about/svcs/advisory/pi/SecLitStudy 
_2006_Final.pdf (reporting that for cases that settled between $1 million and $50 mil-
lion, the average settlement amount was $9.6 million, but that the average for all cases 
settled in 2006 was $62.3 million, and that 11% settled for over $100 million); LAURA
E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
SETTLEMENTS: 2006 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 3 & fig.3 (2007), available at
http://www.cornerstone.com/pdf/practice_securities/2006Settlements.pdf (reporting 
that over 60% of all securities class action settlements in 2006 were for less than $10 
million, consistent with past years).  The average settlement is well within average lim-
its. See Cox, supra note 6, at 512 (“[A]pproximately 96% of securities class action set-
tlements are within the typical insurance coverage, with the insurance proceeds often 
being the sole source of settlement funds.”). 
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on the interaction between law and insurance in the corporate and 
securities law context.22  In the first article, we described how insurers 
evaluate risk in underwriting D&O policies and analyzed the implica-
tions of the policies’ role in furthering the deterrence objectives of 
corporate and securities litigation.23  In the second article, we investi-
gated the relationship between insurer and insured during the life of 
the policy; we found that D&O insurers do almost nothing to monitor 
the risky activities of their corporate insureds and that, as a result, 
D&O insurance is a pure risk-spreading form of insurance, raising the 
attendant moral-hazard concerns.24  In this third and final Article, we 
inquire into the role of the D&O insurer at settlement, asking whether 
the deterrence function of securities law is reintroduced through an 
insistence on merits at settlement or whether other dynamics at set-
tlement subvert deterrence. 
A common theme underlying our work in this area is the extent to 
which liability insurance preserves or subverts the deterrence objec-
tives of corporate and securities law.  Scholars customarily treat deter-
rence as the principal objective of civil damages in corporate and se-
curities litigation.25  Because D&O insurance funds the settlement of 
corporate and securities litigation, any deterrent effect of settlement 
can only be achieved by the insurance intermediary.26  In order for 
22 We are not the first to address the role of insurance in settlement.  See, e.g., Ber-
nard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1067 (2006) (focusing 
on the importance of D&O insurance in explaining why outside directors almost never 
pay their own money in corporate and securities litigation settlements).  However we are 
the first to address it directly with extensive participant interviews, relating our empirical 
observations from those interviews to the question of merit in securities litigation. 
23 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 516-17 (finding that in addition to employ-
ing a variety of financial risk factors similar to those used by investors, underwriters 
evaluate risk through a consideration of a corporation’s “deep governance” structure, 
which includes an assessment of the firm’s “culture” and management’s “character”). 
24 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance:  
The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1822-23 (2007) (arguing, 
furthermore, that the entity-protection aspects of D&O coverage are likely to be pure 
waste from a diversified shareholder’s point of view). 
25 See id. at 1817-18; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action:  
An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1536 (2006) 
(emphasizing the deterrence function of securities class actions over the compensation 
function). 
26 This fact, of course, does not mean that bad acts are wholly undeterred.  Civil 
litigation is but one of the misfortunes that can befall one engaged in securities fraud, 
to which job loss, regulatory fines, and jail time must be added.  See, e.g., Jonathan M. 
Karpoff et al., The Legal Penalties for Financial Misrepresentation 3 (May 1, 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=933333 (comparing 
regulatory and private penalties for misrepresentation claims).  Our focus is solely on 
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civil litigation’s potential damages awards to deter, D&O insurers must 
in some way preserve the deterrent effects of the liability regime.  Do 
they?  Our prior research was not optimistic on this point.27  And we 
are no more optimistic here, finding that D&O insurance clouds the 
role of the merits in the settlement process.  Moreover, putting this 
insight together with those gleaned in our prior research, we ulti-
mately conclude that, absent disclosure, D&O insurance significantly 
undermines the deterrence function of shareholder class actions. 
The Article proceeds as follows:  Part I provides a brief back-
ground on shareholder litigation and its procedural stages.  Part II 
discusses competing definitions of the merits in securities class ac-
tions.  Part III reports our findings on the role played by merits in se-
curities settlements, how the settlement process works, and how ideas 
about merit ultimately translate (or fail to translate) into a settlement 
amount.  Part IV applies our findings to the debate over merit and of-
fers our policy proposals, recommending increased disclosure of cor-
porations’ D&O coverage and a reduction in entity-level coverage.  We 
close, finally, with a brief summary and conclusion. 
I. SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LAW AND PROCEDURE
Although there are many potential bases for shareholder actions,28
federal securities law claims are the most significant in terms of both 
absolute numbers and settlement values.29  Our participants reported 
that securities class actions are “head and shoulders above” any other 
the component of deterrence against which would-be defrauders can be insured—i.e., 
civil litigation—and to which our conclusions are limited. 
27 In our first article, we concluded that risk-based pricing by D&O insurers is 
likely to have very little impact on the behavior of corporate executives—both because 
of the difficulty of predicting securities litigation risk and because D&O insurance 
prices and other contract terms are not disclosed to investors.  Baker & Griffith, supra
note 8, at 536, 538-40.  We concluded in our second article that D&O insurers do not 
engage in any significant monitoring and that, as a result, D&O insurance poses a sig-
nificant moral hazard.  Baker & Griffith, supra note 24, at 1817. 
28 See generally 2 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE 
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 17.02 (7th ed. 2003) (listing 170 possible grounds for li-
ability in shareholder litigation). 
29 One study found that 77% of shareholder class actions from 1993 to 2002 were 
securities class actions, although the authors admit that this is likely overstated.  Theo-
dore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements:  An Empiri-
cal Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 46 (2004); see also TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 
20, at 60 exhibit 83 (reporting that more than 80% of claims made against public 
companies dealt with securities issues). 
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liability exposure.30  For this reason, our qualitative research focused 
exclusively on securities class actions.  This section briefly describes 
the law and procedure of the securities class action. 
A.  Substantive Law 
Class action securities litigation arises most often under section 11 
of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)31 and under section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).32  Sec-
tion 11 claims address misrepresentations and omissions in registra-
tion statements and may be brought not only against the issuer’s di-
rectors and officers, but also against the bankers, accountants, and 
lawyers involved in the offering.33  Although the section is applicable 
to a wide variety of defendants, section 11 claims arise in a single fac-
tual context:  registered offerings—that is, transactions in which a 
company sells securities to the public by means of a registration 
statement filed with the SEC.34  Much activity in the securities market 
occurs outside of this context and, thus, is free from section 11 liability. 
Rule 10b-5,35 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) under the authority of section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act, has a much broader reach than section 11 of the Securities Act.  
30 Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Monitoring 
Counsel #9, at 11 (Aug. 4, 2005) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) (“The 
big exposure to D&O, . . . head and shoulders above everything else, is securities class 
actions . . . .”); see also id., Interview with Policyholder #3, at 5 (Oct. 12, 2004) [herein-
after D&O Interviews, Policyholder #3] (claiming that “[s]ecurities litigation outweighs 
derivative litigation by far”).  In the last two years there has been an unusually large 
number of derivative actions, many of which have arisen out of the recent revelations 
regarding options backdating.  It is too soon to tell whether this increase indicates a 
trend or a unique event.  In 2006, 22 of 131 securities cases filed were options backdat-
ing cases; in 2007—a year in which 38 subprime cases were filed—there were projected 
to be about 4.  See PLANCICH ET AL., supra note 21, at 2 (breaking down the types of fed-
eral shareholder class action suits for false registration statements). 
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2006) (codifying the Securities Act’s provision for civil 
liability for false registration statements). 
32 See id. § 78j (codifying the Exchange Act’s prohibition of manipulative and de-
ceptive devices). 
33 See id. § 77k (detailing the persons liable, the persons exempt, and the nature of 
the liability for misrepresentations and omissions). 
34 See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 481 
(5th ed. 2006) (noting that the “essence” of a section 11 claim begins with “[a] mate-
rial misrepresentation or omission in a registration statement”). 
35 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
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Rule 10b-5 is “the ‘catch-all’ antifraud provision,”36 proscribing 
fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity.  Although 10b-5 claims may arise in a wide variety of contexts, 
10b-5 class actions are most often brought against companies for mis-
statements made in their public disclosures, especially financial re-
ports.37  In a typical 10b-5 claim, plaintiffs allege that a company’s re-
lease of false financial information had the effect of inflating (or 
deflating) the company’s share price, causing investors to buy (or sell) 
and thereby to suffer monetary loss when the truth is revealed and the 
share price adjusts.  The ability of 10b-5 claims to reach beyond the 
relatively limited context of registered offerings has caused it to 
dominate other potential bases for securities law liability.  In 2007, 
80% of securities class actions alleged violations of Rule 10b-5; only 
19% alleged a section 11 violation.38
Plaintiffs bringing a 10b-5 claim must show that the defendants, 
acting with scienter, made a material misstatement on which the 
plaintiffs relied and that caused a financial loss.  Recklessness gener-
ally satisfies the scienter requirement.39  But scienter nevertheless 
36 STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
ANALYSIS 252 (2005). 
37 See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 25, at 1545 (“[A]lthough it would be an over-
statement to say that the securities class action exclusively polices fraud in financial re-
porting, this seems to be its primary role.”). 
38 See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS, 2007: A
YEAR IN REVIEW 1 (2007) (reporting 2218 class actions, excluding IPO-allocation, ana-
lyst, and mutual-fund actions, filed between 1996 and 2007).  In 2007, only 10% of se-
curities class actions alleged a claim under section 12(2) of the Securities Act, which 
provides a remedy for securities sold by the issuer to the public pursuant to a false or 
misleading prospectus or oral communication.  Id. at 21 exhibit 19; cf. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77l(a)(2); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 573 (1995) (limiting the applicabil-
ity of section 12(2) to issuer communications in public offerings).  We note that these 
are cumulative remedies and that the percentages need not add to one hundred. 
39 The proper standard for scienter has not been elucidated fully by the Supreme 
Court.  See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 & n.12 (1976) (rejecting a 
negligence standard and holding that private plaintiffs must show scienter, but reserv-
ing the question of whether recklessness satisfies the standard).  As a result, courts of 
appeals have fashioned their own standards, with most accepting that the standard has 
been met when a defendant, unaware of the true state of affairs, can foresee the likeli-
hood that a statement will mislead.  See, e.g., AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 
F.3d 202, 234 (2d Cir. 2000) (“In securities law, however, the critical issue is what a rea-
sonable investor would have considered significant, and foreseeability is generally from 
the plaintiff’s point of view . . . .”); SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 76 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980) (holding that information is material if “there is a substantial likelihood that 
a reasonable shareholder would consider [it] important in deciding how to vote” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 
438, 449 (1976))). 
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poses a significant hurdle for plaintiffs due to a combination of two of 
the PSLRA’s features:  (1) the stay of discovery until the motion to 
dismiss has been decided;40 and (2) the requirement that plaintiffs 
plead facts giving rise to a “strong inference” that the defendants had 
the requisite state of mind.41  The standard for scienter was most re-
cently discussed by the Supreme Court in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues 
& Rights, Ltd.,42 in which the Court resolved a split among the circuits 
in interpreting the “strong inference” standard.  There, the Court 
held that “[t]o qualify as ‘strong’ within the intendment of [the 
PSLRA], we hold, an inference of scienter must be more than merely 
plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as 
any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”43  Plaintiffs, in other words, 
must equal or surpass the plausibility of any innocent inference that de-
fendants may claim could arise from the same set of facts.  We are told 
that without access to discovery, this is no small feat.44  As a result, 
proving scienter is typically seen as a significant obstacle to plaintiffs. 
Materiality, in contrast, is not a significant barrier to claims.  In 
10b-5 claims, as in other securities law contexts, materiality depends 
upon a “reasonable investor” standard, which is not difficult to show 
given significant investor losses.45  Similarly, reliance is unlikely to con-
stitute a serious barrier to plaintiffs since, on the basis of the “fraud on 
the market” theory, when shares trade in an efficient market, public 
40 PSLRA sec. 101(b),  § 27(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(1) (2006). 
41 Id. § 21D(b)(2),  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
42 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007). 
43 Id. at 2504-05 (emphasis added). 
44 Plaintiffs’ lawyers commented that “sometimes . . . cases that don’t look very 
good turn out to be great, and sometimes cases that look really good at the beginning 
turn out not to be so good, because you really don’t know [prior to discovery].”  Tom 
Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Plaintiffs’ Counsel #3, at 8 
(May 25, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [hereinafter D&O Inter-
views, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #3].  Similarly, a defense lawyer noted that neither side can 
get a firm sense of scienter until discovery:  “[Y]ou want to get a sense of . . . what your 
documents look like.  In the days of electronic discovery and e-mail, there is usually 
something, enough smoke in there that can be a concern to both sides.  There is a lot 
more detail than there used to be.”  Id., Interview with Defense Counsel #1, at 14-15 
(Mar. 24, 2007) [hereinafter D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #1]; see also id., Inter-
view with Claims Head #6, at 26 (May 16, 2007) [hereinafter D&O Interviews, Claims 
Head #6] (“Sometimes you get into discovery, and the discovery shows that[] what 
these plaintiffs thought was a real meritorious case really is nothing.”). 
45 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (deeming in-
formation to be material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure . . . 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
‘total mix’ of information made available”). 
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statements are incorporated into share price and reliance is presumed 
for any investor trading at the market price.46  Indeed, apart from sci-
enter, the only significant substantive legal obstacle to recovery for a 
corporate misrepresentation may be the requirement, recently af-
firmed by the Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,
that the plaintiffs show a causal link between the misrepresentation 
and the plaintiffs’ loss.47
Loss causation, as the requirement is commonly known, is not 
new.48  What the Supreme Court said in Dura, most basically, is that 
merely pointing to an inflated security price after a misrepresentation 
is not sufficient to establish loss causation.  Instead, the pleadings 
must include “some indication of the loss and the causal connection 
that the plaintiff has in mind.”49  What exactly plaintiffs must plead to 
establish loss causation after Dura, however, remains unclear.50  For 
claims resembling what we have been treating as the paradigmatic se-
curities claim—plaintiffs purchasing under the cloud of a misrepre-
sentation and holding until a corrective disclosure has a significant 
impact on the security’s price—Dura does not present additional diffi-
46 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) (“Recent empirical studies 
have tended to confirm Congress’ premise that the market price of shares traded on 
well-developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any ma-
terial misrepresentations.”).  Of course, if defendants can show that the relevant mar-
ket does not efficiently impound information into share price, the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption of reliance will not apply.  See, e.g., In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 
F. Supp. 2d 260, 272 (D. Mass. 2006) (noting that scholarship that doubts the existence 
of perfect information efficiency sets a significant hurdle for plaintiffs). That the plain-
tiffs actually traded is a necessary element of the claim.  See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749-55 (1975) (holding that plaintiffs must be those who 
purchased or sold securities, not those who merely held them, between the time of the 
misstatement and the corrective disclosure). 
47 See 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (“[A]llowing a plaintiff to forgo giving any indica-
tion of the economic loss and proximate cause . . . would bring about harm of the very 
sort the [PSLRA] seek[s] to avoid.”). 
48 Courts have long treated loss causation as an element of Rule 10b-5, and in 
1995, the PSLRA codified loss causation.  See PSLRA sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(4), 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2006) (“[T]he plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the 
act or omission of the defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for 
which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”). 
49 Dura, 544 U.S. at 347. 
50 See Merritt B. Fox, After Dura:  Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J.
CORP. L. 829, 847-48, 850-56 (2006) (including in the issues that remain open situa-
tions where the plaintiff sells the security at a price higher than her purchase price, the 
price does not drop immediately after the corrective disclosure, and the plaintiff sells 
shares prior to the corrective disclosure). 
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culties.51  However, the situation is less clear when the market price 
does not react significantly to the corrective disclosure or where plain-
tiffs sell prior to the corrective disclosure.  Commentators have sug-
gested that it may still be possible to plead loss causation in these 
situations, perhaps by offering a theory of how the truth leaked into 
the market (and therefore into the security’s price) prior to the cor-
rective disclosure.52  “Leaky truth” theories may support claims where 
there is no price reaction to the corrective disclosure as long as a price 
reaction can be shown when the leak occurred.53  Such theories may 
also support the claims of plaintiffs who sold prior to the corrective 
disclosure if they can argue that the price at which they sold reflected 
a leaked truth that had the effect of lowering the price and therefore 
causing their loss.54  By leaving these and other details to be worked 
out by lower courts, however, the Supreme Court has not settled the 
controversy surrounding the pleading of loss causation so much as it 
has flagged it as an area for future developments.  Our participants 
regularly noted the importance of Dura, but also acknowledged that it 
remains to be seen what effect Dura and its progeny will ultimately 
have on securities settlements. 
As we describe in the sections that follow, the substantive law is 
almost always expressed in motions practice.  Trials are exceedingly 
rare in securities class actions, and adjudicated outcomes after the 
motion to dismiss are almost unheard of.55  This means that issues aris-
ing from Tellabs and Dura and all other substantive legal standards are 
51 See id. at 849 (noting that there is “little doubt that [such a] plaintiff satisfies the 
Court’s requirements under Dura concerning causation”). 
52 See, e.g., Jay W. Eisenhofer et al., Securities Fraud, Stock Price Valuation, and Loss 
Causation:  Toward a Corporate Finance-Based Theory of Loss Causation, 59 BUS. LAW. 1419, 
1443-44 (2004) (describing a test for loss causation that determines whether disclo-
sures revealing the effect of fraud actually affect share price). 
53 See id. at 1444 (“An essential underpinning of our test is determining whether 
specific disclosures that reveal the effect of the fraud . . . actually impacted the share 
price of the stock at issue.”); Fox, supra note 50, at 850-51 (“The fact that there was no 
negative price reaction after the unambiguous announcement . . . does not rule out 
the possibility that the misstatement inflated the purchase price[,] . . . because . . . the 
market may have realized the true situation prior to the public announcement of the 
truth.”).
54 See Eisenhofer et al., supra note 52, at 1442-43 (“The questions are:  (i) was the 
stock price inflated by fraud; and (ii) has the stock price declined because the fraud is 
no longer propping up the price?”); Fox, supra note 50, at 854-55 (“[T]o prove that 
the misstatement caused a loss, the plaintiff must both show that the misstatement in-
flated the purchase price and that his sale occurred after at least partial market realiza-
tion of the true situation.”). 
55 Cf. Fighting Class Actions, FIN. TIMES (U.S. & Can. ed.), Nov. 29, 2007, at 14. 
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evaluated, for the first and essentially last time, at the pleadings stage.  
The implications of this fact are explored in greater detail below.56
B.  Procedural Stages 
Procedurally, the securities class action resembles much other 
large-scale, aggregate litigation.  As alluded to above, however, the 
PSLRA changes the environment by increasing the plaintiffs’ burden 
to survive the motion to dismiss and staying discovery until the motion 
is decided.  Most claims proceed through predictable stages, including 
investigating and filing, class certification and lead plaintiff selection, 
the motion(s) to dismiss, discovery, trial preparation, and finally, set-
tlement.
1.  Investigation and Filing 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers monitor the securities markets in search of po-
tential claims.  They are looking for the same three things that any 
contingent-fee lawyer does:  liability; damages; and defendants with 
the ability to pay.57  Absent information to the contrary, ability to pay 
is typically assumed at this stage in the litigation,58 and plaintiffs’ law-
yers focus on liability and damages.  If they can tie a significant stock 
drop (which will go to damages) to a financial misstatement or nega-
56 See infra Part I.B.3. 
57 See D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #3, supra note 44, at 8-10 (explaining 
that a potential case must show sufficient grounds for liability in order to survive a mo-
tion to dismiss at the outset); Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Roundta-
ble Discussion, The Role of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance in the Settle-
ment of Securities Class Actions, at the Fordham Corp. Law Ctr., in N.Y., N.Y., 59 (Nov. 
16, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [hereinafter D&O Roundta-
ble] (“[L]et me just say I don’t see a lot of this as very much different than negligence 
cases in the Bronx Supreme Court in lots of ways.”); see also Tom Baker, Transforming 
Punishment into Compensation:  In the Shadow of Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 211, 
222 (quoting a plaintiffs’ personal injury lawyer who said, “I was taught on my first day 
of practice there are three things:  liability, damages, collectibility”). 
58 As a plaintiffs’ counsel put it, 
[s]o what we do is we have to figure out what we consider to be a wide range 
of damages very early on.  Then we have to take a look at the solvency of the 
corporate defendant.  You know, we will take a look at the company and just 
form some kind of rough judgment in our own minds, is this a company that 
is likely to have insurance and if so, a lot of insurance, a little bit of insurance?  
We don’t even really worry about the insurance if the company is solvent. 
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Plaintiffs’ Counsel #5, at 
7-8 (May 24, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [hereinafter D&O 
Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #5]. 
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tive news story (which may go to liability, either for misrepresentation 
or failure to disclose), they will have the basic elements of a claim.  
Large plaintiffs’ law firms continuously monitor the portfolios of insti-
tutional investors, seeking to keep them apprised of potential claims 
and thereby increasing their chances of being selected as lead plain-
tiff.59  Smaller law firms become aware of prospective claims on a more 
ad hoc basis, through contacts with former employees, disgruntled in-
vestors, or referring attorneys who represent the prospective plaintiff 
for other purposes, such as real estate transactions or estate plan-
ning.60
Once a plaintiffs’ firm is aware of a potential claim, it will begin to 
investigate the claim.  The firm will engage in a detailed review of the 
company’s public documents and SEC filings and, frequently, retain a 
private investigator to interview former employees or others with in-
side knowledge about the corporate defendant.61  Initially, these inves-
tigations will help the plaintiffs’ firm determine whether to file a 
claim.  Once the claim is filed, however, this informal investigation is 
likely to continue, perhaps even to intensify, in an effort to unearth 
facts to support the complaint.  Recall that the PSLRA both raises the 
59 See id., Interview with Plaintiffs’ Counsel #6, at 2-3 ( June 5, 2007) [hereinafter 
D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #6] (noting that his firm monitors market devel-
opments for institutional developments and that “one way or another we will either 
hear from the client, or we will be reporting to the client on what we are seeing”); id.,
Interview with Plaintiffs’ Counsel #7, at 2 [hereinafter D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ 
Counsel #7] (“[W]e monitor the research analyst [who] has this general Bloomberg 
and Dow Jones terminal[] and access to all the financial news and keeps CNN and 
CNBC going on a 24/7 basis, etc., etc. . . .”). 
60 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Plaintiffs’ 
Counsel #1, at 10-11 ( Jan. 31, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) (de-
scribing how his firm obtains clients through referrals from the brokers that his firm 
represents in other capacities and through other lawyers); D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ 
Counsel #3, supra note 44, at 4-6 (describing how his firm relies on referrals from law-
yers whose specific business is developing clients to pass on to litigation firms). 
61 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Plaintiffs’ 
Counsel #4, at 6 (May 31, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [here-
inafter D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #4] (describing how his firm employs law-
yers whose “sole job is to look at significant market movements,” accompanied by some 
kind of disclosure, and then to “look at what the disclosures were sixty or ninety days 
before and if there is a gap, then they will do further investigation . . . to see whether 
[the gap is] associated with facts that suggest there was a nondisclosure”); see also D&O 
Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #6, supra note 59, at 2 (“We have private investigators 
and use them.”); D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #7, supra note 59, at 1-2 (“We 
employ a team of people that includes three lawyers, a former Wall Street research 
analyst . . . , three or four private investigators that are led by a former FBI agent . . . , 
and we employ forensic accounting consultants . . . .”). 
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bar to survive the motion to dismiss and stays discovery until the mo-
tion has been decided.  As a result, the plaintiffs’ firm will often con-
tinue the informal investigation of the claim until formal discovery 
begins, seeking to amend the complaint with any new and damning 
information found along the way. 
This dynamic has two important implications, both increasing the 
amounts paid at settlement.  First, because plaintiffs invest more effort 
in investigating their claims, surviving claims on the whole may be 
more likely to include facts that are damaging to defendants, thereby 
increasing settlement amounts.  Second, because plaintiffs expend re-
sources of time and money in their investigative efforts (including re-
sources spent on investigations of claims that ultimately are dismissed), 
they will, on the whole, require greater settlements in order to recoup 
their costs, thereby increasing settlement amounts.62
2.  Class Certification and Lead Plaintiff Selection 
As in other class actions, securities class actions proceed under the 
nominal direction of representative plaintiffs but under the actual di-
rection of the lawyers chosen to represent the class.  With the enact-
ment of the PSLRA, Congress sought to alter this dynamic by award-
ing control over the plaintiffs’ class not to the first to file but to the 
“most adequate plaintiff.”63  Now, in place of the old system, under 
which the plaintiffs’ firm that filed the first complaint had an advan-
tage in the court-directed process through which the class counsel was 
selected,64 the filing of a class action starts a sixty-day competitive 
process among plaintiffs’ firms to identify and recruit those plaintiffs 
who are most likely to be deemed the “most adequate plaintiff” and 
thereby endowed with the authority to name class counsel.65  The big-
62 This may result from a selection effect in which lawyers decide not to take the 
less profitable cases, from the lawyers working the selected cases more intensively, or 
some combination of the two. 
63 PSLRA sec. 101(b), § 21D(a)(3)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006); see
also James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter?  An Empirical Analysis of 
Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1595 (2006) (describ-
ing the “rebuttable presumption that the member of the class with the largest financial 
stake in the relief sought is the ‘most adequate plaintiff’”). 
64 See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 6, at 2062-63 (noting that the lawyer filing 
the first complaint is often appointed lead counsel by the court, and even where a 
court has a different procedure for appointing lead counsel, it generally also “rewards 
lawyers who file early”). 
65 Judges retain some discretion in selecting class counsel.  The identity of the lead 
plaintiff can be affected by the definition of the class period (different institutional 
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gest investors tend to be deemed the “most adequate.”66  As a result, 
the trick is for the plaintiffs’ firm to represent large institutional inves-
tors or, in some cases, groups of investors.67
Although the PSLRA seems to have been effective in ending the 
freewheeling days when plaintiffs’ lawyers had, at best, nominal clients 
with no real influence over their claims,68 plaintiffs’ actual involve-
ment in the litigation remains secondary in most cases.  Institutional 
shareholders were lead plaintiffs in only 18% of the securities class ac-
tions during the post-PSLRA period.69  As a result, the plaintiffs’ law-
yer is still largely in control of the prosecution and, ultimately, settle-
ment of the claim.70  Recent research suggests that cases with 
investors will have held different amounts of the affected securities during different 
periods), by the degree to which law firms are permitted to assemble groups of plain-
tiffs, and by the judge’s assessment of the representativeness of the proposed plaintiff 
or plaintiffs’ group.  See Cox et al., supra note 14 (listing cases in which the largest 
plaintiff was not selected as lead plaintiff). 
66 PSLRA sec. 101(b), § 21D(a)(3)(B)(iii)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(1). 
67 See Stephen J. Choi, Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class Actions 13-20 (Law 
& Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-53, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1293926 (reporting that even after the PSLRA, plaintiffs’ 
lawyers remain influential in the selection of the lead plaintiff—often by aggregating 
groups of plaintiffs and cutting side deals); see also Cox & Thomas, supra note 63, at 
1588-90 (noting that the PSLRA’s rebuttable presumption that the investor with the 
largest financial stake has the most interest produces strong incentives for plaintiffs’ 
firms to seek out that investor); D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #4, supra note 61, 
at 7 (describing how in a potentially significant class action, leading plaintiffs’ law firms 
often wait until the very last day to file, so as not to tip off their competitors about the 
size of the potential losses that they have accumulated for their lead plaintiff applica-
tion).  The leading lawyers know each other, know who the key institutions are, and 
know which institutions tend to go with which lawyers, and our participants described 
a level of gamesmanship in trying to assess the extent of potential losses accumulated 
on competitors’ lead-plaintiff applications. 
68 As described by a prominent mediator, 
In a typical pre-PSLRA mediation, the mediator would ask the plaintiffs’ law-
yer to go out in the hall and speak to the client about a proposed offer.  Per-
plexed, the plaintiffs’ lawyer would respond, “I don’t have a client here.”  
“Well then,” the mediator would respond, “why don’t you go to the restroom, 
look in a mirror, talk to yourself, and come back here and tell me whether you 
want to accept the settlement or not.” 
Nicholas Politan, Mediating Securities Class Actions:  A View From the Captain’s Quarters,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ADVOC., Fourth Quarter, 2005, at 1, 9. 
69 Cox & Thomas, supra note 63, at 1623 & tbl.3; see also James D. Cox & Randall S. 
Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table:  Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securi-
ties Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 877 tbl.3 (2002) (reporting similar findings). 
70 See Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers:  
Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1529 (2006) 
(reporting that institutional investors “tend to develop repeat relationships with only a 
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institutional shareholders settle for a higher percentage of investor 
loss than other cases, but the researchers have not been able to draw a 
conclusion about cause and effect.71  This correlation may be the re-
sult of institutional investors choosing to play a lead role in the more 
valuable cases rather than the result of institutional investors changing 
the dynamics of settlement negotiation.72
After the court selects the lead plaintiff and class counsel, defen-
dants have the option of challenging the class certification.  However, 
largely due to the presumption of reliance derived from the fraud-on-
the-market theory, class certification has not traditionally been a sig-
nificant hurdle for plaintiffs’ lawyers.73  Recently, however, class certi-
handful of the top-tier plaintiff law firms”); see also Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O 
Interviews, Interview with Plaintiffs’ Counsel #8, at 13 (unpublished interviews, on file 
with authors) [hereinafter D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #8] (“[The plaintiffs’ 
firms are] spending money left and right going to political things. . . . [T]he guys who 
control the business in the public pension funds are all people who stand for election, 
and I don’t have to tell you that somebody who stands for election [is interested in re-
ceiving campaign contributions].”). 
71 See Cox & Thomas, supra note 63, at 1624 & tbl.4, 1625 (reasoning that because 
institutional investors choose to appear in bigger, high-quality cases, settlement 
amounts will be higher when an institutional investor is present); Michael A. Perino, 
Institutional Activism Through Litigation:  An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Par-
ticipation in Securities Class Actions 3 (St. John’s Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Re-
search Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938722 (find-
ing that cases with public-pension-fund plaintiffs have greater settlement amounts and 
lower attorneys’ fees). 
72 TODD FOSTER ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SHARE-
HOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 13 (2007), available at http://www.nera.com/ 
image/PUB_Recent_Trends_Sep2007-FINAL_4color.pdf (reporting that, on average, 
class actions with an institutional investor acting as lead plaintiff settle for approxi-
mately one-third more than actions involving other kinds of lead plaintiffs). 
73 But for the fraud-on-the-market theory, each individual plaintiff would need to 
demonstrate reliance on the misrepresentation, a showing that would cause individual 
issues to dominate common-class issues, thereby preventing class certification.  See Fox, 
supra note 50, at 839 (explaining that the fraud-on-the-market theory allows plaintiffs 
to prove reliance based on their paying a price that was too high in a purchase and not 
based on the defendant’s actual misstatement).  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(b)(3) states that an action may be maintained if “the court finds that the questions 
of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members.”  But some defendants have been successful at chal-
lenging the efficiency of the relevant market, thus requiring plaintiffs to make individ-
ual showings of reliance and thereby successfully challenging class certification.  See,
e.g., In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 453 F. Supp. 2d 260, 271 (D. Mass. 2006) (hold-
ing that the plaintiffs did not make a strong enough showing of their own market effi-
ciency to apply the fraud-on-the-market theory); see also Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, 
D&O Interviews, Interview with Defense Counsel #4, at 13-14 (May 31, 2007) (unpub-
lished interviews, on file with authors) [hereinafter D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel 
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fication has become a more frequently contested stage of the securi-
ties class action.74  Arguments over “loss causation” and other re-
quirements are increasingly heard at that early stage.75  And indeed, 
although there is some controversy over the degree to which inquiry 
into the merits of a claim is permitted at the class certification stage—
Supreme Court precedent seems to point in both directions76—most 
circuits permit some discretionary weighing of the merits at the class 
certification stage.77
#4] (explaining ways to challenge class certification and citing Polymedica as an exam-
ple of what can work). 
74 See D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #5, supra note 14, at 18 (“[C]lass certifica-
tion . . . is becoming a much more rigorous process than it had [been].”). 
75 See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 271 
(5th Cir. 2007) (vacating a class-certification order in a securities action because plain-
tiffs had not shown loss causation).  However, most district court decisions in other 
circuits are at odds with this holding. See Lapin v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 04-2236, 
2008 WL 4222850, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2008) (providing an overview of district 
court decisions that “have rejected the notion that a showing of loss causation is a re-
quirement at the class certification stage”); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certifica-
tion in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 
3), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1247720 (critiquing the analysis performed 
by courts at class certification and emphasizing the role of courts in clearly articulating 
the governing law). 
76 Compare Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (“[N]othing in 
either the language or history of Rule 23 . . . gives a court any authority to conduct a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be 
maintained as a class action.”), with Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) 
(holding that courts must conduct a “rigorous analysis” of the Rule 23 requirements), 
and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 n.12 (1978) (stating that the 
analysis of Rule 23 requirements will be “intimately involved with the merits of the 
claims” (quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3911, at 489 n.45 (1976))).
77 See, e.g., Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001) (permit-
ting courts to “look[] beneath the surface of a complaint to conduct the inquiries 
identified in [Rule 23],” and holding that if those Rule 23 inquiries “overlap [with] the 
merits . . . then the judge must make a preliminary inquiry into the merits”).  A similar 
rule is followed in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits.  
See, e.g., Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 
196, 202 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that in the Second Circuit, “the preponderance of 
the evidence standard applies to evidence proffered to establish Rule 23’s require-
ments”); In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that district 
courts must determine that each of the Rule 23 requirements has been met prior to 
certifying a class, even where Rule 23 requirements involve factual disputes and over-
lap with the merits); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 298 (1st 
Cir. 2000) (noting that “a district court must formulate some prediction as to how spe-
cific issues will play out in order to determine whether common or individual issues 
predominate in a given case”). 
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3.  The Motion to Dismiss, Discovery, and Settlement 
Following the stiffening of the pleading requirements in the 
PSLRA, the motion to dismiss has become a very important screen in 
securities class actions, with courts routinely dismissing about 30% of 
securities class actions filed in a given year.78  Our participants re-
ported that defendants filed a motion to dismiss in every case with 
which they were familiar, that settlement discussions almost never take 
place until after the motion is filed, and that settlement discussions 
typically do not take place until after the class action has survived the 
motion to dismiss.79
Most substantive legal arguments are heard at the time of the mo-
tion to dismiss.  In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts generally ac-
cept as true all well-pleaded allegations80 as well as all plausible infer-
ences arising from them.81  They also view the complaint in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party.82  In securities class actions, 
however, the PSLRA complicates this standard.  Well-pleaded allega-
tions are still regarded as true, but following the Tellabs decision, any 
inference of scienter must be more than merely reasonable or plausi-
ble; it must be at least as strong as any competing inference of non-
fraudulent intent.83  In this way, at least with regard to scienter, the 
motion to dismiss presents plaintiffs in securities class actions with a 
stricter standard than in other federal claims.  Moreover, as noted 
above, Dura may pose additional difficulties to some plaintiffs in 
78 Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act 32 tbl.1 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Pa-
per No. 07-008, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=975301.
79 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Claims Head 
#2, at 21 ( Jan. 30, 2006) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [hereinafter 
D&O Interviews, Claims Head #2] (“The events surrounding a motion to dismiss are 
the first genuine settlement opportunity.”); D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #7, 
supra note 59, at 18-19 (“[T]here are natural breaking points for settlement discus-
sions.  The first is generally after the motion to dismiss is decided . . . .”); D&O Inter-
views, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #8, supra note 70, at 27-28 (“Well, the biggest issue is surviving 
the motion to dismiss.  I mean if you survive a motion to dismiss you’re going to be 
okay until you get to summary judgment, and usually those cases settle.”).
80 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (establishing the pleading standard in federal courts). 
81 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007) (holding that to 
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to support a “plau-
sible”—and not merely “conceivable”—claim for relief). 
82 See Cool v. Int’l Shoe Co., 142 F.2d 318, 320 (8th Cir. 1944) (“[O]n a motion to 
dismiss for insufficiency of statement, the complaint should be construed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff and with all doubts resolved in his favor.”). 
83 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. 
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pleading a theory of loss causation.84  These facts thus enable the mo-
tion to dismiss to function as a screening for merit.85  Nevertheless, a 
hearing on the pleadings where the allegations are treated as facts and 
plaintiffs benefit from a favorable presumption with regard to factual 
inferences is not the same as a proceeding that finds facts and forces 
plaintiffs to prove their claims.  The motion to dismiss does not ren-
der judgment on the truth of the allegations, nor does it provide any 
guide to the amount of damages that the defendants ought to pay 
were the allegations to be proven. 
Surviving the motion to dismiss essentially clears the case for set-
tlement, since summary judgment is rare.  Our participants reported 
that class actions typically do not last to the stage when they are ripe 
for summary judgment,86 and few of those that go all the way through 
discovery are in fact resolved through summary judgment.87
Trial, moreover, is virtually unheard of.  In an empirical study go-
ing back to 1980, a period in which thousands of securities fraud cases 
were filed,88 Black, Cheffins, and Klausner found only thirty-seven se-
84 See supra notes 47, 49 and accompanying text. 
85 See D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #4, supra note 61, at 4 (describing how 
plaintiffs must invest more in a case to prove its strength in order to survive the motion 
to dismiss after the PSLRA); see also Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 620-21 (2006) (provid-
ing evidence that claims lacking hard evidence of fraud are more likely to be dismissed 
in the post-PSLRA period); Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 643-45 (finding that plain-
tiffs after the PSLRA tailor their accusations to a real likelihood of fraud in order to 
survive a motion to dismiss). 
86 See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Monitor-
ing Counsel #8, at 11 ( June 13, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors)
[hereinafter D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #8] (“[T]here is a lot of talk in the 
industry about how some of these cases need to be pushed to summary judgment and 
not to settle until a decision is made at the summary judgment level, but to date I am 
literally not aware of a single one.”). 
87 As one monitoring counsel noted, 
[T]here is often a big pressure to settle.  Often you want a relatively quick 
space after the motion to dismiss litigation phase. . . . Some people are kind of 
thinking through that a little bit more because it makes sense to push some of 
these cases towards summary judgment or not [depending on] how likely [it 
is] that you can likely get summary judgment in a 10b-5 case where the motion 
to dismiss is denied. . . . I am not aware of any 10b-5 cases that have been dis-
missed at the summary judgment stage. 
Id. at 10.  An exception to this rule is the WorldCom case, which generated a summary 
judgment opinion. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004).
88 NERA reports that between 1991 (when they started collecting this data) and 
2007, around 3900 federal securities cases were filed against public companies.  See
2009] How the Merits Matter 777
curities law cases seeking damages that were tried to judgment.89
RiskMetrics’ Securities Litigation Watch reports that only six cases 
have gone to trial since 1996.90  The JDS Uniphase trial in late 2007 
would appear to be the exception that proves the rule.91  As a result, 
once a claim survives the motion to dismiss, all involved know that the 
odds strongly favor an eventual settlement. 
Our participants emphasized, nevertheless, that they do prepare 
for trial, if only to have a credible threat.92  This means embarking on 
discovery, which, as every lawyer knows, is both laborious and expen-
sive.  Our participants reported that the cost of simply creating the 
document-discovery database in a significant class action is itself a 
multimillion dollar proposition.93  The cost of discovery creates an ob-
vious and well-known incentive for defendants to settle.94  While plain-
tiffs’ costs are not usually as high as defendants’,95 it is worth noting 
that the defendant’s higher costs do not necessarily give the plaintiff 
an advantage, as defense costs reduce available insurance limits.96  As-
suming that the claim will settle within insurance limits, this means 
that increasing defense costs also decreases the total pot available to 
PLANCICH ET AL., supra note 21, at 2 (charting the total number of federal filings an-
nually); see also CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 38, at 5 exhibit 3 (reporting 2218 
class actions filed from 1996 to 2007); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 21, at 2 
(2007) (reporting similar numbers). 
89 Black et al., supra note 22, at 1064.  The statistic includes only securities law cases 
seeking damages from “public companies, their officers and directors, or both.”  Id.
90 See ADAM T. SAVETT, RISKMETRICS GROUP, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION TRIALS IN 
THE POST-PSLRA ERA 2 (2008), available at http://slw.riskmetrics.com/ 
SCAS%20Trials.pdf. 
91 See Fighting Class Actions, supra note 55. 
92 See D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #4, supra note 73, at 29 (“What you do 
know is that when it goes to trial, defendants tend to win.  You do know when it goes to 
trial, our experts will outperform their experts . . . .”); D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ 
Counsel #5, supra note 58, at 11 (“[H]aving a firm trial date where a jury is going to 
decide for you or against you is often a driver for settlement.”).  Of course, if every case 
settles well before reaching the courthouse steps, the threat rings empty. 
93 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Monitoring 
Counsel #2, at 51 (May 3, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [here-
inafter D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #2] (reporting that electronic data dis-
covery alone costs $1 million to $3 million in a public-company securities case). 
94 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 401-03 
(2004) (providing a formal model and offering examples of how trial costs encourage 
parties to settle rather than continue litigation). 
95 See Black et al., supra note 22, at 1098 (“In securities and corporate litigation, 
defendants’ costs are usually higher than plaintiffs’ costs . . . .”). 
96 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 495 n.29 (estimating that defense costs rep-
resent at least 25% of a typical class action settlement). 
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plaintiffs in settlement.  Thus, plaintiffs may also have a strong incen-
tive to avoid high discovery costs. 
Settlement, of course, is the way out of discovery.  Consistent with 
this expectation, our participants reported that although settlement 
can happen at any point in the process,97 it most often occurs after the 
motion to dismiss, when the machinations of discovery have begun.98
By focusing in this paper on the role of merits at settlement, we do 
not mean to discount the role that merits may play at other points in 
the process.  As noted above, the substantive merits of a claim are in-
creasingly involved in the class-certification decision and are the guid-
ing consideration in the motion to dismiss.  Some consideration of 
merit clearly is involved in the litigation process.  Indeed, if one as-
sumes that cases surviving the motion to dismiss are more meritorious 
than cases failing to survive the motion—a reasonable assumption in 
our view—then the fact that virtually no cases settle prior to a decision 
on the motion to dismiss suggests that merits do affect outcomes in 
shareholder suits.  Moreover, the fact that 30% of motions to dismiss 
are granted suggests that a significant screening of claims is taking 
place at the motions stage.  These facts belie the conclusion that mer-
its do not matter. 
97 Our participants reported that the immediate impetus to settle is likely to be a 
corporate event—a change of CEO, merger, or acquisition transaction, or other cor-
porate event that causes the defendant to wish to eliminate contingent liabilities, in-
cluding the pending securities claim.  See, e.g., D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #5, 
supra note 14, at 14-15 (“[I]t could be that they want to sell the company and they want 
to get everything behind them[,] . . . [or] that they are going to get rid of the CEO . . . 
and they want to have everything happen on the watch of the old CEO.”); Tom Baker 
& Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Defense Counsel #6, at 1 (May 15, 
2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [hereinafter D&O Interviews, De-
fense Counsel #6] (explaining that litigation usually results from corporate-governance 
problems or the hiring or firing of a CEO); id., Interview with Monitoring Counsel #6, 
at 22-23 (May 8, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [hereinafter 
D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #6] (describing situations such as a change in 
general counsel, a new CEO, or a proxy fight threatening exposure preceding litiga-
tion).  Such events can, of course, occur at any time during the life of a claim. 
98 See Choi et al., supra note 78, at 5 (noting that the PSLRA prevents discovery 
while there is a pending motion to dismiss); see also D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel 
#1, supra note 44, at 14 (“[T]he real opportunity [to settle] is right after the motion [to 
dismiss] is denied . . . .”); D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #8, supra note 86, at 10 
(noting that a promising opportunity for settlement comes “after the motion to dismiss 
litigation phase”); D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #7, supra note 59, at 19 (“I don’t 
know what the percentages are, but there are a group of cases that will be settled in 
between the date the judge comes down with the decision [on the motion to dismiss] 
and the date you start to get heavily involved in discovery.”). 
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Nevertheless, if one assumes that some nonmeritorious suits sur-
vive the motions stage—another reasonable assumption in our view—
then the question becomes what mechanisms exist to make outcomes 
at settlement reflect the merits of the claim.99  Indeed, even if the mo-
tions stage provided a perfect screen for nonmeritorious claims—if, in 
other words, no meritorious claims were dismissed and only meritori-
ous claims survived the motion—then the question of how settlement 
practices take into account a claim’s underlying merits would still be 
an important one in determining whether the dollar amount at set-
tlement reflects the severity of the defendant’s fraud.  In a world 
where merits matter, both serious and minor frauds should survive the 
motion to dismiss, but serious frauds ought to cost defendants more 
than minor ones.  We think that it is important to investigate the role 
of merits at settlement for both reasons—because the question of how 
the merits affect settlement amounts is a critical question, and because 
we suspect that at least some nonmeritorious claims survive the mo-
tion to dismiss.  The question of merits at settlement is thus our princi-
pal focus in this Article. 
II. WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT MERITS
The term “merits” regularly appears in both academic and popu-
lar discussions of litigation, often in opposition to the term “frivo-
lous.”100  In this common usage, a lawsuit is understood to be merito-
rious if the facts that the plaintiff alleges are true and if the plaintiff’s 
legal theory is sound.  By extension, the merits matter if the resolution 
of the case strongly depends on the probability that the facts are true 
and the legal theory is sound.  By contrast, a lawsuit is frivolous if the 
facts that the plaintiff alleges are false or if the plaintiff’s legal theory 
is unsound.  By extension, the merits do not matter if the probability 
99 We note that it is also reasonable to suppose that some claims that would ulti-
mately prove meritorious are disposed of at the motion to dismiss because, without 
discovery, not enough facts could be found to support the “strong inference” standard 
for scienter.  The motion to dismiss, in other words, is probably both over- and  
underinclusive as a filter for merit. 
100 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive 
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1251, 1254 (2002) (critiquing the class-certification rules for 
“avoid[ing] inquiring into the merits of substantive issues” and thus “inviting frivolous 
class action suits”); Choi, supra note 85, at 599 (noting that “the PSLRA requires courts 
to review a class action on the merits . . . and impose sanctions . . . on frivolous litiga-
tion”). 
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that the facts are false or the legal theory is unsound does not strongly 
affect the resolution of the case. 
If the merits in securities litigation could be objectively shown, it 
would be possible to resolve the question of whether and how much 
they affect the resolution of claims.  Yet securities litigation does not 
have a simple, objective quality that can be used to measure merit.101
Indeed, our participants offered various understandings of merit and 
differed on whether the merits matter.102  The problem, of course, is 
not unique to securities litigation.  The “do the merits matter” ques-
tion poses a challenge to nearly all forms of liability:  to demonstrate 
on the basis of external, objective evidence that the right people are 
being held liable for doing what the law forbids. 
If, at the simplest level, we understand the merits exclusively in 
terms of the liability elements of a claim, litigation outcomes are 
judged according to how well settlement amounts accord with evi-
dence of liability.  Did the defendant in fact engage in those activities 
that the law defines as the basis of liability?  Are damages paid pre-
dominantly in cases where there is strong evidence of wrongdoing?  
Are damages greater in those cases with relatively more evidence of 
wrongdoing?  This approach accords with the commonsense view of, 
for example, doctors who might tend to view a malpractice claim as 
meritorious only if a physician’s conduct falls below the relevant stan-
101 See generally Choi, supra note 9, at 1472-73 (noting the problematic character of 
“merit”); Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 649 (cautioning that the proxies used in their 
article may not fully capture “merit”). 
102 See supra notes 74-77; see also D&O Interviews, Claims Head #6, supra note 44, at 
62 (“Well, it’s impossible for me to guess what other people mean when they say ‘mer-
its,’ and I, well I like the concept of settling the cases based on the merits.  I haven’t 
quite given up on that hope, but it just doesn’t happen.  The most I can hope to 
achieve is to get a reasonable settlement value based on what other cases, similar cases 
are being resolved for.”); Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with 
Defense Counsel #2, at 3 (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [hereinafter 
D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #2] (“[I]t’s like the difference between gross motor 
skills and fine motor skills.  Merits matter, but they matter at the level of the gross mo-
tor skills.”); D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #6, supra note 97, at 10 (“[M]y experi-
ence is that the level of settlement has nothing to do with the merits of the claim.”); 
D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #6, supra note 97, at 29 (“I have almost relig-
iously said merits do matter, because most of the time if you pay attention to what 
really happens meaningful[ly] at the friction points in either mediations or other set-
tlement discussions, it is ultimately the fear of bad facts being proven, and I think that 
is merits.”).
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dard of care and who are therefore appalled by the strong role that 
the size of potential damages plays in the decision to sue or settle.103
One problem with this liability-centered understanding of merit is 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to find an objective standard of 
truth by which to judge the liability elements of a claim.  Researchers 
have sought to construct such standards in other areas of the law, and 
their efforts are instructive.  In the context of medical malpractice liti-
gation, for example, medical experts have conducted large-scale, 
closed-claim-file reviews, making independent judgments about the 
merits of claims.104  There are, unfortunately, no comparable closed-
claim studies of securities class action settlements.  Indeed, there is 
some reason to doubt that there ever will be, given that the answer to 
the key liability question in a securities class action—whether the de-
fendants acted with reckless disregard for the truth—lies hidden in a 
way that the question of whether a doctor followed medical custom is 
not.
If we seek to understand the merits in terms of all of the legally 
defined elements of a claim, including damages,105 we build back into 
our implicit model the incentive created by the law for the parties to 
take into account not only whether a given activity is permitted, but 
also what the costs of engaging in it are likely to be.  Understood in 
this way, the merits matter as long as settlements bear a reasonable re-
103 This may explain why some of the closed-claim research treats payment as an 
on/off variable rather than a continuous variable.  See, e.g., Frederick W. Cheney et al., 
Standard of Care and Anesthesia Liability, 261 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1599, 1601-02 (1989) (us-
ing payment as both an on/off and continuous variable); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey 
Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments:  Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 997, 1006 (1990); Stephen J. Spurr & Sandra Howze, The Effect of Care Qual-
ity on Medical Practice Litigation, 41 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 491, 502-04 (2001); see also
Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the Resolu-
tion of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 781-82 (1992) (treat-
ing settlement or jury award as simply “payment” while also subdividing jury award by 
amount).  For a criticism of that approach, see Tom Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard 
Medical Practice Study Conclusions About the Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 501, 508 (2005). 
104 See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 68-87 (2005) (collecting and 
analyzing the closed-claim-file literature published through March 2004); David M. 
Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation,
354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2024 (2006) (reporting the results of the most recent and 
most definitive medical malpractice closed-claim-file review); see also Philip G. Peters, 
Jr., What We Know About Medical Malpractice Settlements, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1783, 1787-1802 
(2007) (explaining the latest effort to collect malpractice-settlement research). 
105 Cf. D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #4, supra note 73, at 50 (“I count dam-
ages as part of merits.”). 
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lationship to the probability that the defendants committed fraud, 
multiplied by the potential damages in each case.106  Put another way, 
the merits matter as long as the fault and loss causation variables 
would be positive and significant in a well-constructed regression 
model of securities class action settlements in which the settlement 
amount is the dependent variable. 
Some securities class action researchers have approached the mer-
its question in just this way, collecting data on readily identifiable in-
dicia of wrongdoing and settlement amounts.  They identify proxies 
for fraud—such as concomitant SEC investigations, earnings restate-
ments, and insider trading—and test to see whether cases with such 
proxies are more likely to survive a motion to dismiss and then settle at 
a higher value than claims without such evidence.107  Their answer is 
yes, in both cases, which supports the view that merit matters.108  But 
these researchers are only using proxies, as they acknowledge, and their 
regression models only explain part of the variation in settlements that 
they observe. 
We propose to use a very different methodology to consider the 
relationship of the merits to settlement outcomes:  qualitative reports 
from participants in the securities class action settlement process 
about the role of the merits in that process.  As with any other empiri-
cal research method, ours has limitations.  For example, our partici-
pants do not have direct access to an objective truth.  They have better 
access to the evidence than anyone else, but they are hardly objective.  
They serve interests; they do not seek the truth. 
For that reason we do not claim to be answering the question “Do 
the merits matter?”  Indeed, the question whether the objectively true 
merits matter is a meaningless research question for us, not because it 
is unimportant, but because it cannot be answered.  There is not now, 
nor is there ever likely to be, a judge or jury in possession of knowl-
edge of all relevant facts of a claim.  Indeed, precious few judges or 
juries ever sit in final adjudication of securities litigation.  In our view, 
therefore, a better way to approach the merits of securities class action 
106 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial:  A Theoretical Analysis Under 
Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 74 (1982) (mod-
eling settlement outcomes based on different variables). 
107 See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 632 (opting to investigate multiple attrib-
utes instead of a single attribute as was done in prior research). 
108 See id. at 649 (concluding that the “study provides some evidence that the mer-
its do matter more, at least in the filing of complaints and the allegations included in 
those complaints”). 
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claims is by focusing on the understanding that can be reached 
through existing institutions.  The better questions are “What are ‘the 
merits’ in the settlement process?” and “How do they matter?” 
III. FIELD RESEARCH ON SETTLING SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTIONS
With the problem of merits firmly in mind, we began our inter-
views.  Building on an initial round of forty-eight interviews conducted 
in connection with our earlier research on D&O insurance pricing 
and loss prevention,109 we conducted an additional round of over fifty 
interviews, focusing on those most involved in the settlement of secu-
rities class actions.  Our participants included twelve claims managers 
from ten D&O insurance companies, eleven lawyers who specialize in 
bringing shareholder litigation on behalf of shareholders, twelve law-
yers who specialize on the defense side of shareholder litigation, ten 
lawyers who specialize in representing D&O insurance companies in 
the monitoring and settlement of shareholder litigation, two policy-
holder coverage counsel, three mediators who are actively involved in 
the settlement of shareholder litigation, two experts who assist parties in 
assessing the damages in shareholder litigation, and two claims advisors 
from two brokerage houses.  In addition, we presented an early draft of 
our findings at a confidential, off-the-record roundtable of practitioners 
and industry experts, who read and commented on our work.110
We acknowledge that our sample is neither large nor random.  We 
began our interviews with people about whom we learned in our prior 
research, then worked outward to references from those interview-
ees.111  Despite the self-selecting and self-referential nature of this 
sample, we can describe the settlement process with some confidence 
because the securities class action field is remarkably small and 
109 In the first phase of our research we interviewed forty-one people involved in 
selling and buying D&O insurance:  brokers, underwriters, risk managers, reinsurers, 
and attorney advisors.  See Baker & Griffith, supra note 24, at 1798 (describing inter-
views with over forty people regarding “the relationship between D&O insurers and 
their public company insureds”); Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 493 (describing the 
breakdown by job type of the forty-one people interviewed). 
110 See generally D&O Roundtable, supra note 57, at 4 (describing the goals and 
conditions of the discussion). 
111 It is worth noting that no one whom we approached refused to be interviewed.  
We did not interview everyone we approached because of the limits of time.  In order 
to avoid a potential bias attributable to the time constraints of the most busy attorneys, 
we made a special effort to interview attorneys with a reputation for being in great de-
mand during the period of our interviews. 
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densely connected.112  On the plaintiffs’ side, the universe of players 
has remained small and relatively stable,113 with the top eight plain-
tiffs’ firms accounting for 75% of total settlement collections.114  The 
defense bar is less concentrated than the plaintiffs’ class action bar, 
but the panel-counsel lists maintained by the top D&O insurance car-
riers provide a good guide to that bar, and perhaps not surprisingly, 
the top New York and national firms are well represented.115  D&O in-
surance, moreover, is a highly concentrated market, clustering around 
two dominant primary insurers—AIG and Chubb—which together ac-
112 As one of our participants said, quoting a co-coverage counsel, “it’s a really 
small sandbox.  You don’t want to pee in it.”  Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O In-
terviews, Interview with Monitoring Counsel #3, at 73 (May 25, 2007) (unpublished 
interviews, on file with authors) [hereinafter D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #3].  
As another monitoring counsel noted, 
Because the bar is so small, your personal reputation counts.  Integrity counts.  
Saying you are going to do a deal means something.  You know double cross-
ing someone, maybe you can pull it off once, but you are going to be caught.  
So there is that, that you trust people within this circle, and of course you do 
have all the due diligence and documentation and settlement agreements that 
are [a] million pages long, but there is some level of trust, some level of candor. 
D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #8, supra note 86, at 25. 
113 See Choi & Thompson, supra note 70, at 1518 (arguing that the PSLRA initially 
succeeded in making this universe smaller, but that in recent years the universe has 
expanded to pre-PSLRA levels).  Even as firms have split, the major players have re-
mained the same, as the pay-to-play controversy surrounding Mel Weiss and Bill Lerach 
has shown. See, e.g., Barry Meier, Another Notch for U.S. Prosecutors:  Lawyer Pleads Guilty 
in Kickback Case Involving His Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2007, at C3 (describing Ler-
ach’s indictment on behavior stretching back to the 1970s); Barry Meier, Top Class-
Action Lawyer Faces Federal Charges:  Accused of Payoffs to Enhance Legal Fees, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2007, at C3 (reporting on the indictment of Melvyn Weiss for obtaining $250 
million in legal fees on class action cases for which his firm paid kickbacks to plain-
tiffs); David Weidner, No Class, But a Lot of Action:  Bill Lerach, MARKET WATCH, Aug. 30, 
2007, http://www.marketwatch.com (enter “Bill Lerach” in Search Box in upper 
righthand corner; then follow second hyperlink to “David Weidner’s Writing on the 
Wall”) (reporting that despite Lerach’s departure, his firm had filed twelve class ac-
tions in August 2007). 
114 See ADAM SAVETT, RISKMETRICS GROUP, SCAS 50 POWER RANKINGS 1 (2007) 
(providing data on settlement amounts from 2003 to 2006 for the top fifty securities 
class action firms).  Of note, we treat Milberg Weiss and Lerach Coughlin as two sepa-
rate firms even in 2003, and we treat firms that have retained the same key named part-
ner(s) over the years as the same firm. See also Choi & Thompson, supra note 70, at 
1515 tbl.3 (reporting that four plaintiffs’ firms have handled cases that represent 50% 
of the total settlement value since 1995). 
115 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 24, at 1816-17 (noting that though the panel 
counsels from two of the leading D&O insurance companies did not include all lead-
ing securities defense firms, those firms on the list were primarily large national firms 
or specialized litigation firms with distinguished reputations). 
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count for more than half of the market for primary insurance.116  The 
excess D&O insurance market is broader, but both primary and excess 
markets are intermediated through the personal connections of a few 
brokerage firms.117  Moreover, a small number of outside law firms 
handle the settlement responsibilities of most of the D&O insurers 
and, thus, serve to bring to claims managers the same breadth of in-
formation about the settlement market that the brokers bring to un-
derwriters about the D&O insurance market.  As a result, we are con-
fident that we can accurately describe the securities class action 
litigation field based on a number of interviews that may seem small to 
researchers accustomed to working with large quantitative data sets. 
We approached the question of what matters in settlement both 
directly and indirectly in our interviews.  We began indirectly by ask-
ing participants to describe the settlement process and to explain 
what drove the parties to settlement.  We then approached the ques-
tion of value directly, asking them to describe what factors, in their 
experience, are most important in determining the ultimate settle-
ment amount.  In the sections that follow, we describe what we 
learned.
A.  Liability and Damages in Securities Settlements 
In our interviews, we devoted substantial effort to learning how 
the parties arrived at a settlement amount.  From a process perspec-
tive, the participants described negotiations that involved slow move-
ment from extreme positions, almost always through mediation.118
116 AIG and Chubb account for approximately 60% of the market by premium 
volume. TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 20, at 39 exhibit 54.  By policy count they rank 
third and first, respectively, while ACE ranks second.  Id.
117 Only about twenty-six firms are active in the public D&O insurance market at 
any time.  Id.
118 Consider the following description of the settlement process, as related by a 
monitoring counsel: 
 A.  It’s starting off on opposite extremes and working to the midpoint. 
 Q.  And what is . . . one of the tools that you use to get to the midpoint? 
 A.  Basically, arguing to the plaintiffs that their case doesn’t have a sex ap-
peal, doesn’t have the players, doesn’t have the damages, doesn’t have any of 
the factors that make a case expensive, and sometimes you win, sometimes you 
lose.
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Monitoring Counsel #7, 
at 35-36 ( June 13, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [hereinafter 
D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #7]. 
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Consistent with the standard economic model of settlement,119 our 
participants explained this process in terms of predictions about how 
liability and damages would be assessed at trial.120  Yet the fact that se-
curities class actions almost never go to trial complicates the story.  
With no trials to use as comparisons, expected trial-value calculations 
are, in an important sense, fictions. 
In terms of the economic model of settlement, a $200 million set-
tlement of a securities fraud action with a 5% chance of success repre-
sents the ordinary and unremarkable operation of the civil justice sys-
tem, as long as the likely damages that would be awarded in the event 
that the plaintiffs proved fraud are $10 billion or more.  Yet, without 
trials, there is no experience-based way to estimate the probability of 
judgment, unless the parties agree that the defendant committed 
fraud (in which case there is no doubt about the merits), and, even 
then, the parties almost certainly will not agree about the damages.  A 
statement that, for example, $30 million is an acceptable settlement 
because there is a 10% chance of being held liable for $300 million 
cannot be justified on the basis of experience.  The number of trials is 
simply too small to support any such conclusion.121  Yet lawyers do talk 
that way, and these assessments may be “objective” in the sense that 
the assessments are shared by others in the field.  But, at best, a state-
ment like this actually means, “This case is like other cases that we 
have settled in the belief that there is a low but worrisome probability 
of a plaintiffs’ verdict and in the belief that the damages could be in a 
similar range.”  Liability and damages, like the other factors that we 
will explore, can only be assessed in securities class actions in relation 
to other settlements, not in relation to trial results. 
1.  Liability 
Consistent with prior research, the factors that our participants 
named as important in explaining settlement outcomes included a 
host of factors that might be understood as “hard evidence” of securi-
119 See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6-30 (1984) (presenting a model that predicts litigation outcomes 
based on economic conditions). 
120 See, e.g., D&O Roundtable, supra note 57, at 57 (“[I]t’s not just a question of ‘Is 
it liability or damages?’  It’s really, ‘What are the probabilities for success?’  You can 
call it any label you want.”). 
121 Cf. Marc Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 201, 246-51 (questioning the ability of trial lawyers to predict jury verdicts). 
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ties fraud.122  For example, our participants frequently mentioned 
earnings restatements, insider selling, and SEC investigations as highly 
significant in determining settlement outcomes.123  They also men-
tioned facts that might support a story of earnings mismanagement, 
such as questionable revenue recognition practices, especially where 
the managerial compensation was associated with stock perform-
ance.124  These kinds of facts provide evidence of a motive for fraud, 
supporting the plaintiffs’ assertions of scienter.125
Upon further examination, however, it became clear that our par-
ticipants are not just interested in fitting the facts of the case into an 
established legal category.  Rather, they are looking for “factors in the 
litigation that give it what is normally referred to as ‘sex appeal.’”126
Cases with sex appeal are cases that have exciting facts or are part of a 
122 See Johnson et al., supra note 11, at 634-36 (examining factors such as false or 
misleading forward-looking statements, stock sales by executives and directors, and 
weak corporate governance (which often leads to SEC investigations), and the ability 
of these factors to predict settlement outcomes in cases of alleged securities fraud). 
123 A plaintiffs’ counsel listed the factors that increase settlement value as includ-
ing “[r]estatement, insider selling[,] . . . suspicious stock repurchase programs[,] . . . 
accounting violations . . . [, and] rebates which often go[] on in the . . . resale whole-
sale industry.”  D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #6, supra note 59, at 18.  In addi-
tion, a mediator told us that 
[the mediator will say] “Look, there is no sizzle in this case.  You don’t have 
any of the upgrades,” he said, “that make this a nice case.  You don’t have the 
accounting restatement.  You don’t have the SEC investigation.  You don’t 
have the executives being led out of the office in handcuffs, all of which are 
sort of sizzle facts,” he said, “that might lead to a nice settlement for the plain-
tiffs.  You don’t have any of that stuff.  This is kind of a boring case.” 
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Mediator #2, at 8 ( June 
4, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [hereinafter D&O Interviews, 
Mediator #2]; see also D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #7, supra note 118, at 8 
(“[T]here are some factors in the litigation that give it what is normally referred to as 
sex appeal.  And you know insider trading . . . where the defendants have profited 
greatly from their sale of the company stock, that gives a case sex appeal.  And the 
backdated options cases are a perfect example of that, and there is not really much in 
the way of hard injury to the company from these backdated options . . . .”). 
124 See D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #6, supra note 59, at 18 (“What else 
[might affect settlement outcomes]?  Obviously bonuses associated with stock per-
formance.”).
125 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the standards that the 
courts of appeals have created for establishing scienter). 
126 D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #7, supra note 118, at 8; see also Tom 
Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Claims Head #1, at 22 (Dec. 
2005) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [hereinafter D&O Interviews, 
Claims Head #1].  The same Claims Head also noted that “the sexier the case, the 
more interest there is.”  Id.
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scandal.127  As one mediator put it, a “boring” case that “[took] place 
in a dimly lit corner of the accounting world” does not have the “siz-
zle” of “the SEC investigation,” or “the executives being led out of the 
office in handcuffs.”128  A plaintiffs’ lawyer explained, “You need sex 
appeal, you know.  We used to think that just a restatement case was 
great because it was [an] admission, but you need more than just a re-
statement.  You need a restatement and you need some benefit[, you 
need to show] that somebody benefited by the wrong.”129
We suspect that when our participants spoke to us about sex ap-
peal, they were describing factors that cognitive psychologists might 
consider under the vividness or “availability” heuristics.130  Neverthe-
less, vivid and exciting facts may increase the settlement value of a 
claim without indicating greater merit because such facts may embar-
rass or shame defendants into settlement.131  One defense lawyer em-
phasized that executives are often unwilling to take the stand to ex-
plain a bad business outcome.132  Another lawyer described a situation 
in which at least part of the sizzle was sharp business practices that 
called into question the business ethics of the defendants.  But sex ap-
127 Describing how he gets an initial impression of the value of a claim, one claims 
head distinguished between cases with sex appeal and those without:  “[Y]ou take a 
look at what is alleged.  You know, is this part of a scandal?  Is this one of these where it 
is outright cooking of the books?  Or is it . . . just old-fashioned misrepresentations of 
what they call projection cases?”  Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Inter-
view with Claims Head #3, at 35 (Feb. 12, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with 
authors) [hereinafter D&O Interviews, Claims Head #3]. 
128 D&O Interviews, Mediator #2, supra note 123, at 8. 
129 D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #8, supra note 70, at 30. 
130 See Norbert Schwarz & Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited:  
Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as Distinct Sources of Information, in HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 103, 103 (Thomas Gilovich et al. 
eds., 2002) (describing the “availability” heuristic as the means by which individuals 
estimate the likelihood that an event will occur, and examining studies that attempt to 
explain the underlying mental processes involved in the availability heuristic). 
131 As one observer explained, 
More often than not . . . we hear there is really nothing there, but there‘s 
these documents and these e-mail messages that if taken out of context could 
be embarrassing and maybe would put things together so that we would have 
something to explain to a jury, and by the way, our president and CFO and 
CEO, there’s no way we can possibly present them to a jury. 
D&O Interviews, Claims Head #6, supra note 44, at 26-27. 
132 D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #6, supra note 97, at 9-10, 14-15 (emphasiz-
ing the cost to the organization of executive testimony in terms of lost executive time, 
bad publicity, and legal costs in preparing for deposition and testimony, and also not-
ing the possibility that the relevant people may no longer be with the organization and 
would therefore make unreliable witnesses). 
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peal or sizzle does more than inconvenience or shame defendants; it 
makes the plaintiffs’ story more appealing and pulls the imaginary 
jury in the lawyer’s mind closer to the plaintiffs’ view of the case, 
thereby increasing the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s bargaining power at settle-
ment.133
Sex appeal is not the same as the technical merits of a claim, but it 
relates to merits, as illustrated in the following story told by a plain-
tiffs’ lawyer: 
 [I had] a one quarter restatement case.  At the end of the quarter the 
company booked a sale where the customer had the right to return the 
goods.  So instead of it being a bona fide final sale where the risk of loss 
transferred to the customer, instead it was a conditional sale where the 
customer could take the goods and if he could sell them or wanted to re-
turn them he could.  And so that doesn’t qualify for revenue recognition 
because basically the transfer of risk never left the seller to go to the 
buyer. . . . 
 . . . [A]nd then the company within a quarter or two after that dis-
closed the fact that they improperly—they didn’t use the word im-
proper—but that they booked revenue they shouldn’t have and . . . re-
stated. . . . [B]ut the case lacks sex appeal.  Why did it lack sex appeal? 
 At the end of the quarter what I would have liked to have seen was 
some insider . . . selling, so that the guy who improperly booked the 
thing and basically inflated the price in the marketplace benefited by 
selling some of their stocks and say, “Ah-ha, the reason they did this [is] 
because they wanted to sell stock” . . . . So the motive for keeping the 
revenue and earnings up and everything else would be to keep the price 
of stock up. 
 [But] nobody sold their stock.  And so the argument then that’s be-
ing made by the defendants is, “Oh, this was a, you know, this was negli-
gence, it wasn’t fraud, what’s the dah, dah, dah, dah, dah” . . . . [A]nd I 
don’t have an answer because I don’t have any juice, I don’t have any sex 
appeal.
134
133 See D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #6, supra note 97, at 31 (“[I]t’s about 
telling you the story and having somebody gasp as you are saying it and say, you know, 
‘I can’t believe it.’”). 
134 D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #8, supra note 70, at 28-29.  As one defense 
lawyer put it, “[I]nsider trading makes a dramatic difference in terms of the value of a 
case.  Now you say, ‘Well that’s not really the merits.  That’s the cosmetics.’  OK, [but] 
they merge a little bit.”  D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #4, supra note 73, at 50. 
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Insider trading is not an element of the cause of action, but it provides 
evidence of motive.  Motive can establish scienter, which is one of the 
elements of the cause of action.135
Factors giving a case sex appeal or sizzle include SEC investiga-
tions, criminal charges, suspicious stock repurchase programs, defen-
dants pointing fingers at each other, the resignation of board mem-
bers, whistleblowers, termination of senior officers, bad documents, 
and a variety of case-specific facts that cast the defendants’ motives or 
honesty in a bad light—the sorts of things that we are likely to re-
member about the securities-fraud cases reported in the newspapers.136
Consistent with the emphasis on sex appeal, many of our partici-
pants asserted that the merits do matter in determining the amount 
paid to settle a case.  As one monitoring counsel put it, “[M]ost of the 
time, if you pay attention to what really happens meaningful[ly] at the 
friction points in either mediations or other settlement discussions, it 
135 See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the standards that the cir-
cuit courts have created for establishing scienter). 
136 See, e.g., D&O Interviews, Claims Head #3, supra note 127, at 35 (distinguishing 
between weaker “old-fashioned misrepresentation of projection cases” and “accounting 
manipulations” that involve “outright cooking of the books”); Tom Baker & Sean J. 
Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Claims Head #5, at 59-64 (Mar. 14, 2007) 
[hereinafter D&O Interviews, Claims Head #5]; id., Interview with Claims Head #7, at 
34-35 [hereinafter D&O Interviews, Claims Head #7] (describing conflicts among par-
ties on the defense side, such as the mistrust between outsiders and insiders when out-
siders believe that they are not receiving adequate information); id., Interview with De-
fense Counsel #3, at 20 (May 23, 2007) [hereinafter D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel 
#3] (“[I]f people have been convicted of crimes and stuff like that, then the plaintiffs 
are going to hang tougher for a bigger number to get a better case.”); D&O Interviews, 
Monitoring Counsel #8, supra note 86, at 34-35, 42 (describing the importance of “hot 
docs,” the termination of a CEO or CFO, and whistleblowers as factors that the defense 
counsel considers in discerning damage amounts); D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel 
#5, supra note 58, at 7-8 (describing board-member resignation occurring immediately 
before a decrease in the value of a stock); D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #6, supra
note 59, at 19 (citing “suspicious stock repurchase programs” as a sign of internal prob-
lems within a company).  For a more concrete illustration, consider the following: 
 Yeah, we’ve had situations where literally there were allegations of trucks 
just going in a circle and then you know coming back, you know like an air-
plane that never lands, but they log it in as a flight.  You know the flight to 
nowhere.  I remember once with a prominent firm you danced around it, but 
essentially didn’t deny that trucks were kind of parked somewhere, and it was 
like a question of you didn’t have enough space we think in these storage fa-
cilities.  They had to move space somewhere else and there were some lame 
things, and those kind of cases are obviously very troubling. 
D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #8, supra note 86, at 42-43. 
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is ultimately the fear of bad facts being proven, and I think that is 
merits.”137
2.  Damages 
Many participants viewed the amount of potential damages as the 
most important factor driving settlement.138  Damages exert a coercive 
influence, defense and monitoring counsel argued, because the initial 
damages estimate—so-called “plaintiffs’-style damages,” based on the 
shift in the defendant’s market capitalization following corrective dis-
closures—can easily be astronomical, presenting an unacceptable risk 
to corporate defendants.139  The larger the plaintiffs’-style damages, 
the argument goes, the less the liability elements—the factors that 
many would consider the true “merit” factors—actually matter.  In-
deed, our participants agreed, the single most significant settlement 
factor is “investor loss.”140  As one defense counsel reported, “[I]f your 
exposure is $5 million, you will handle the case one way.  If it is $500 
million, you are going to handle it another way.”141  Similarly, a moni-
toring counsel explained, “Suppose they have a defense that in a 
$500,000 case every single lawyer worth his [salt says,] ‘Go to a jury 
because you can prove this, and you will prove this.  You can’t go 
137 D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #6, supra note 97, at 29. 
138 See, e.g., D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #1, supra note 44, at 29 (asserting 
that while the merits are a factor in settlement negotiations, the driving force is the 
amount of investor loss, which is reflected in the amount of damages). 
139 See PLANCICH ET AL., supra note 21, at 14 (finding that investor losses are the 
most powerful determinant of settlement values and account for upwards of 50% of 
settlement values’ variation); D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #5, supra note 14, at 
16-17 (arguing that plaintiffs often drive settlement values because insurers pattern 
their responses to claims based on the potential damages to the corporation’s stock 
value caused by harmful disclosures). 
140 D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #1, supra note 44, at 29; see also D&O Inter-
views, Defense Counsel #4, supra note 73, at 11 (“By the time you get to mediation, 
damages is very much in the forefront of the discussion.”); D&O Interviews, Mediator 
#2, supra note 123, at 4 (“Potential damages is the number one thing . . . .”); D&O In-
terviews, Monitoring Counsel #7, supra note 118, at 8-9 (“I think the largest and most 
determining factor is potential damages . . . .”); D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #8, 
supra note 70, at 22 (“[T]he most important factor is the amount of the damage . . . .”); 
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Policyholder #2, at 6 
(May 31, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) (“He said that he thinks 
they do argue about liability but the damages more.”). 
141 D&O Interviews, Defense  Counsel #5, supra note 14, at 16. 
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wrong with this.’  Take the $500 [thousand] and make it $3 bil-
lion. . . . Everybody changes their mind.”142
While investor loss is typically much higher than the legally com-
pensable damages, it still provides a useful, easy means of computing 
the outer limit of what is at stake.143  The head of one D&O insurance 
claims department described how he used the investor loss to set his 
initial reserve on a case: 
When I get a securities claim in, one of the very first things I do is pull 
up just some core statistics and do a true back-of-the-envelope, plaintiffs’-
style damages calculation. 
 So I will go to Yahoo. . . . 
 . . . I will quickly just pull up the chart as I am looking at it and take a 
look at the alleged stock drop . . . and the key is to go to the key statistics 
page and take a look at the float. . . . How many shares were outstanding 
and what the float is. . . . 
 . . . I’m giving the full benefit to the plaintiffs. 
 So take the full float, times [the] dollar amount of the drop. . . . So 
say a hundred million shares times $7 a share is $700 million of potential 
damages. . . . From that I apply what is generally understood, not written
anywhere, but generally understood in the industry for whatever reason, 
and it is just averages I guess, that the garden variety 10b-5 claim will set-
tle for somewhere around 5%, give or take, of plaintiffs’-style damages, 
generally speaking. 
142 D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #6, supra note 97, at 25; accord D&O In-
terviews, Monitoring Counsel #8, supra note 86, at 13 (“[Y]ou said you wanted to talk 
to me about why they don’t get tried, and it’s real simple.  The stakes are just too 
high. . . . [I]t is difficult for insurers to really want to run that risk.”); see also D&O In-
terviews, Defense Counsel #3, supra note 136, at 46 (“I mean you could tick off all the 
reasons you want to settle. . . . The numbers are too big . . . .”); D&O Interviews, Plain-
tiffs’ Counsel #5, supra note 58, at 11 (“[Y]ou are driving your case to trial, and very 
few people want to shoot the moon.”); D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #8, supra
note 70, at 16 (“[T]rying one of these big huge cases, it’s hugely time consuming, 
hugely costly, and hugely risky.”); Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, In-
terview with Mediator #1, at 3 (May 25, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with au-
thors) [hereinafter D&O Interviews, Mediator #1] (“The stakes are huge, and often-
times it requires massive document and discovery investigation, and lots of unsettled 
questions as to actually how to finish the case.”); id., Interview with Monitoring Coun-
sel #4 & #5, at 3 (May 16, 2007) [hereinafter D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #4 
& #5] (“[T]here is too great of a risk for the insured.”); D&O Interviews, Monitoring 
Counsel #7, supra note 118, at 18 (explaining that “the potential exposure is over-
whelming”). 
143 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 12.12[1], at 
533, 12.15[1][J] (4th ed. 2002) (describing damages as a “confused area,” but noting 
that under the 1995 Reform Act, damages are limited to the losses actually caused by 
material misstatements or omissions or what can be legally proven). 
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 . . . So here is . . . $700 million in damages.  5% of that is $35 million.  
I’m 10x80.
144
  Right there I look at it and say I’m probably not going to 
be involved in this case just through that back of the envelope.
145
In his view, the larger this rough-and-ready number, the less likely any 
of the parties to the litigation are willing to take the case to trial: 
Pfizer has—I’m talking off the top of my head—3 billion shares out-
standing, and the stock went down 10 bucks.  That’s $30 billion of dam-
ages.  5% of that is $1.5 billion.  Settlement. 
 And you go to a judge and say, “The damages are $30 billion.  We are 
proposing a settlement that is 5%.  How can you say that is unreason-
able?”  And we say, “It’s unreasonable because it doesn’t reflect the li-
ability,” and they say, “Sure it does.  It’s 5% of the total, but it could hap-
pen.  So it is 5-to-95 chance to win.  Yes, it’s a perfect discount.”  But we 
say to the carriers, “Wait a minute.  Wait a minute.  They have a $250 
million D&O policy.  Are you telling me it is torched on a claim where 
they did nothing wrong?” 
 And so sometimes the numbers will in and of themselves take over, 
and I have that on a number of the pharmaceutical companies or large, 
large, jumbo-cap companies.  I have it with General Motors, General 
Electric.  The stock ticks down $2, which isn’t enormous.  It’s not a free 
fall[.  It’s] based on some news that might be innocuous, and it’s enough 
because that creates a damage pool that is into the billions which imme-
diately gets the plaintiffs’ lawyers out because there [are] damages, and 
the case has value irrespective of the merits.
146
Of course, smaller investor-loss cases also almost always settle, so we 
are skeptical about the claim that the size of the investor loss, alone, 
explains the aversion to trial.  We do, however, think that the size of 
investor loss explains something, particularly in combination with the 
size and structure of the D&O insurance program, so we will return to 
this topic when we discuss the role of insurance below. 
The lawyers handling securities class actions closely monitor the 
settlements in other class actions, and they develop rough settlement 
approximations that are similar to the claims manager’s rule of 
thumb.147  The main difference is that the lawyers generate a range of 
144 “10x80” means that his company sold a $10 million layer of insurance that does 
not come into play until $80 million has been paid by some combination of the in-
sured and the underlying layers of insurance. 
145 D&O Interviews, Claims Head #3, supra note 127, at 34-36. 
146 Id. at 95-96.  The participant, however, conceded in the next breath that “a bet-
ter fraud case . . . would settle faster.”  Id. at 96. 
147 See D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #7, supra note 118, at 8-9 (“I think the 
largest and most determining factor is potential damages[.] . . . [S]tudies . . . that we 
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settlement values, while the claims managers need point values, be-
cause claims managers have to set reserves. 
Investor loss alone, however, does not explain the settlement 
amount in any particular case: 
[T]he plaintiffs’ firm is bringing in their economics, and come up with 
some inflated crazy stuff.  And obviously the defense tries to counter it, 
and actually I think it has worked out pretty well.  If you look at the 
numbers, the settlement compared to the damages, you are talking any-
where from 2% to 6% of [plaintiffs’-style damages]148 if indeed truly you 
think there was something done wrong.  I think it is actually pretty rea-
sonable.  So I can’t really dispute.  You know, there may have been a few 
individual cases where, probably rightfully so, . . . the case settled higher 
because they had more leverage.
149
Investor loss sets the range,150 but other factors determine where a 
case settles in that range.  Combining past experience with the inves-
tor loss in the case at hand allows the lawyers to set a reasonably accu-
rate upper bound on the likely settlement amount, using the high end 
of the percentage of investor loss paid in prior settlements.  The exact 
settlement amount depends on case-specific factors that include the 
participants’ assessment of the strength of the evidence of misrepre-
sentation and scienter, as well as other factors that we will discuss. 
Thus, settlement valuation is analogous to the D&O insurance 
pricing process that we described in our earlier work.151  Just as D&O 
insurance underwriters make an initial assessment of the premium 
based on a simple financial algorithm,152 so too do D&O insurance 
claims managers make an initial assessment of the settlement valua-
tion.  And, just as D&O insurance underwriters arrive at a final price 
refer to are extrapolations from . . . plaintiffs’-style damages.  And they say if the plain-
tiffs’-style damages expert say[s] that damages are X, then the settlement value is a per-
centage within a fairly narrow band of X.”).
148 Our participants used the term “plaintiffs’-style damages” imprecisely.  As a re-
sult, it took us some time to realize that they were using the term differently in differ-
ent contexts.  Sometimes, as in this quotation, the term means the investor-loss 
amount.  Other times it was simply a term of opprobrium for an inflated damages 
number produced using methods that, in the defense lawyers’ view, failed to take loss 
causation adequately into account. 
149 D&O Interviews, Claims Head #5, supra note 136, at 62. 
150 See FOSTER ET AL., supra note 72, at 9 (finding that investor losses are the great-
est predictor of settlement values). 
151 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 527-32 (exploring the three components—
“the algorithm, the system of credits and debits, and the market constraint”—that 
D&O underwriters use to derive an insurance price). 
152 Id. at 528-29. 
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through a credit and debit process that takes into account “deep gov-
ernance”153 and the state of the insurance market,154 so too do D&O 
claims managers arrive at a settlement price that they are willing to 
pay through a negotiation process.  This negotiation process takes 
into account other variables, at least some of which relate to the 
strength of the evidence of fraud and the strength of the evidence 
linking the fraud to the harm—in other words, loss causation. 
It is important to note that in securities class actions, damages can 
be a merits issue even in the narrow, “liability elements” definition of 
that term, because securities lawyers often discuss causation as a dam-
ages issue.  One defense lawyer explained the importance of causation 
as follows: 
In a securities case, if a statement is made in a large-cap stock and there’s 
a big drop . . . in the stock when that statement is shown to be arguably 
inaccurate, OK, the issue[] of . . . loss causation, that’s what the case is 
about.  I mean big stock drops don’t occur for only one reason so that 
this aggregation of those causative factors, particularly after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in [Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo], that’s fre-
quently the only thing that the case is about.  I mean there’s no dispute 
about what was said originally because it’s in a filing.  And there’s no 
dispute about what numbers they reported.  The numbers they reported 
are the numbers they recorded, but the question of . . . whether or not 
people knew that they were reporting something or saying something 
that was misleading is a critical issue, but so [are] the issues that relate to 
loss causation.
155
Causation is an element of liability and, thus, a merits issue even 
under the narrow definition of that term.  Indeed, once the initial 
round of motions is decided, causation may be the most important 
merits issue, as this defense counsel suggests: 
 By the time you get to mediation, damages is very much in the fore-
front of the discussion. . . . [L]iability is there too, but . . . it’s much 
harder to back people off on liability.  It is much more complicated.  It’s 
a lot easier just to say, “OK, just suppose for our given sake you are right.  
There was a terrible fraud here.  How much are you using by way of an 
inflation assumption?  What is your trading model?  What is your theory 
of causation?” 
 . . . .  
153 Id. at 490. 
154 Id. at 529-32. 
155 D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #5, supra note 14, at 17-18. 
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 In other words, you tell me this drug was trading based on its cancer 
cure, and the whole thing of the cancer cure was wobbly bullshit.  I’m 
telling you this company offered a Metabolite for Prozac, and until the 
Prozac folks walked away from Metabolite, that was chasing the stock 
price up, OK.  So you do focus on analysts’ reports, stock-price move-
ments, OK.  Marketplace news, baskets of comparables, and then very di-
vergent forms of assumptions about who was trading and what and so 
forth and so on.
156
Defense counsel claimed that they have the better loss-causation 
and damages experts and that the law is moving their way, but the 
monitoring counsel and mediators stressed the uncertainty in the law, 
especially in its application to facts.157  Indeed, one of the defense 
counsel who scorned the plaintiffs’ damages experts later admitted 
that defendants had better experts because they needed better experts, 
and that he did not have a good answer to the following argument: 
[Y]ou can have . . . plaintiffs just saying, “Listen, I’ll go up in front of a 
jury and I’m going to show $2 billion in investment loss that you are go-
ing to have to explain why it is really only $200 million.  In any event, 
you only have $100 million of [D&O insurance in] the tower, and I will 
settle for $124 [million].”
158
As long as the plaintiff is willing to settle the case within a range that is 
reasonable based on past settlements, the available insurance, and in 
some cases the ability of the issuer to pay the excess amount that is 
demanded, the case will settle for an amount that is greater than the 
damage figure produced by an aggressive defense expert’s model.  
The merits are part of that equation, but other variables clearly matter 
as well, as we now discuss. 
B.  The Role of D&O Insurance in the Settlement Process 
If we include loss causation and estimation of the amount of the 
damages as part of the merits of a claim, then the most important 
nonmerits factor in the securities class action context is the ability and 
156 D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #4, supra note 73, at 11-12. 
157 See, e.g., D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #4 & #5, supra note 142, at 2-3 
(“These damages models . . . were very often BS, but an important factor here . . . is 
that the damages models are never tested.”); D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #7, 
supra note 118, at 12 (noting that Dura offered “a great windfall that the defense law-
yers thought was coming their way [but that] just hasn’t materialized because the 
plaintiffs have said, ‘No, you can’t have periodic disclosures which have a cumulative 
effect of bringing the price down.’  So you look at the drop at the occasion of each 
what they call partial disclosure, and that’s what creates the damages”). 
158 D&O Interviews, Claims Head #9, supra note 14, at 20. 
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willingness of the defendants to pay.  As already noted, virtually all 
U.S. public corporations purchase D&O insurance,159 and securities 
settlements are largely funded by insurance proceeds.160  More often 
than not, then, the D&O insurer’s willingness to pay, rather than the 
willingness of the corporation to pay, is what ultimately matters. 
It is important to understand that, despite its label, D&O insur-
ance largely protects corporate rather than individual assets, especially 
in shareholder class actions.  Individual directors and officers are ade-
quately protected by indemnification agreements with their corpora-
tion.161  The corporation, in turn, is protected by the D&O insurer, 
which reimburses it not only for its indemnification obligations to in-
dividual directors and officers, but also for losses it incurs directly as a 
result of securities claims.162  Thus, as we have said previously, D&O 
insurance is, to a very substantial extent, corporate-asset-protection in-
surance, not individual-asset-protection insurance.163
What all of this ultimately means is that, from the perspective of 
plaintiffs and defendants alike, securities settlements are funded by 
other people’s money.  Recognition of this fact is often accompanied 
by the view that other people’s money is easy money.164  As described 
by a monitoring counsel: 
159 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 24, at 1797 (“U.S. publicly traded corpora-
tions—virtually all of them—protect themselves against the costs associated with cor-
porate and securities law liability by purchasing D&O insurance.”). 
160 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 499-501 (“[A]ll D&O policies have the ef-
fect of shifting the risk of shareholder litigation from individual directors and officers 
and the corporation they manage to a third party insurer.”); supra text accompanying 
note 19. 
161 The D&O insurer compensates individual directors and officers only when the 
corporation itself cannot indemnify them, as, for example, when the corporation is 
insolvent or when the payment is to settle a derivative claim.  Baker & Griffith, supra
note 24, at 1802-03. 
162 A typical policy under “Side A” coverage protects each individual officer or di-
rector, “Side B” coverage protects the corporation itself from losses resulting from its 
indemnification obligations to individual directors and officers, and “Side C” coverage 
protects the company when it is itself a defendant in a shareholder claim.  Baker & 
Griffith, supra note 8, at 499. 
163 Baker & Griffith, supra note 24, at 1802-04.
164 See D&O Interviews, Claims Head #1, supra note 126, at 40 (“I think it is easier 
to get money out of an insurance carrier than it is out of an insured.  Why?  Because it 
is a third party’s money.  We are in the business of paying claims.  That is what we do 
for a living.”); D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #3, supra note 136, at 34 (“You know, 
the company doesn’t care about the insurance company’s money.”); D&O Interviews, 
Monitoring Counsel #6, supra note 97, at 25 (“[I]t is much easier to [talk settlement] 
when you can play with somebody else’s money.”). 
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[T]he meeting of the board of directors to decide how to resolve these 
securities class actions goes something like this:  Defense counsel comes 
in, makes a presentation that’s very erudite about the nature of the case 
and the defenses that are available.  At the end of the presentation he 
says that “we believe it would be recommendable and it is appropriate 
and highly recommended that the board approve a resolution that al-
lows us to pay $60 million to resolve this case.”  [The board responds] 
“Gasp, gasp, that’s $60 million. . . . [H]ow are we going to pay for $60 
million?  We just had a presentation with the finance committee, and 
they said we need this, this, and this.  How are we going to pay for $60 
million?”  The general counsel says, “OK, fine.  We have $70 million in 
D&O insurance, and every dollar is coming out of D&O.”  The next 
question is “What time is lunch?”
165
To insurers, of course, the insurance proceeds are their money, 
and they will seek to save it.166  The easy availability of insurance pro-
ceeds, thus, is checked to some degree by the ability of the insurer to 
influence the settlement.  D&O insurers, as a class, can be understood 
to exert an influence over settlement outcomes in line with the extent 
to which the total settlement is funded by insurance.  The insurer will 
have two principal case-specific interests:  first, and most obviously, to 
reduce settlement payouts; and second, to maximize investment re-
turns by delaying the payout of invested capital.167
D&O insurers achieve these interests through their power to veto 
settlement offers.  D&O insurance policies provide that the policy-
holder must obtain the insurer’s consent before entering into a set-
tlement.  As a result, the D&O insurance policy covers only settle-
ments to which the D&O insurer has consented.168  As some D&O 
insurance policies explicitly provide, and as contract law would imply 
in any event, the insurer’s consent cannot be unreasonably with-
165 D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #6, supra note 97, at 26. 
166 In the words of one of our participants, “insurers more often than not are not 
really interested in how good or bad your case is. . . . [W]hat they really want to do is 
save money.”  D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #5, supra note 58, at 23. 
167 The precise percentage of D&O insurer profits from investment on reserves 
cannot be calculated because the aggregate financial statistics used for studying insur-
ance solvency and other topics do not separately report the results of D&O insurance.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to report that in the general category that includes D&O 
insurance (“other liability”), investment income has varied between a high of almost 
28% of net premiums in 1998 and a low of 11% of net premiums in 2002.  See A.M.
BEST CO., AGGREGATES & AVERAGES: PROPERTY/CASUALTY 415 (2007) (reporting re-
sults for net underwriting experience in the insurance industry through 2006). 
168 See AM. INT’L GROUP (AIG), EXECUTIVE AND ORGANIZATION LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE POLICY § 8 (2000) (“The Insureds shall not admit or assume any liability, enter 
into any settlement agreement, stipulate to any judgment, or incur any Defense Costs 
without the prior written consent of the Insurer.”). 
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held.169  But it is only in very unusual situations that a corporation 
would even consider settling without the insurer’s consent. 
The insurer’s veto, however, is not all-powerful.  Indeed, the abil-
ity of the insurer to refuse settlement is subject to an insurance law 
constraint that is potentially much more significant than the contract 
law rule that consent cannot be unreasonably withheld.  Refusal to set-
tle entails the risk that the insurer could be liable for the entire judg-
ment that results, not just the limits of the D&O insurance policy.  As 
described by our participants: 
[I]f there is a demand to settle within the limits and then the insurer 
takes on a very great risk in refusing that demand to settle within limits 
and saying that they are going to seek to go to judgment. . . . They risk 
bad-faith action or some other kind of action that will make them re-
sponsible for the whole amount and not just the limits.  So the defen-
dant wants to settle and the insurer needs to settle in order to avoid the 
bad consequences of refusing to settle.
170
Under longstanding principles of insurance law, a liability insurer that 
refuses to accept a reasonable offer of settlement within the limits of its 
policy has, in effect, waived the limits of the insurance policy and will 
thus be liable for the full amount of any resulting judgment, no mat-
ter how much that judgment exceeds the limits of the policy.171  Given 
the potentially very large damages at stake in a securities class action, 
and the small size of any individual D&O policy in relation to those 
damages, the duty to settle places pressure on D&O insurers.172  In-
deed, our plaintiffs’-lawyer participants confirmed that they craft their 
settlement offers precisely to put this kind of pressure on insurers.173
169 See id. (“The Insurer’s consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, provided 
that the Insurer shall be entitled to effectively associate in the defense, the prosecution 
and the negotiation of any settlement of any Claim that involves or appears reasonably 
likely to involve the Insurer.”). 
170 D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #4 & #5, supra note 142, at 6. 
171 See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1116-17 (1990) (not-
ing that an insurer’s failure to accept a reasonable settlement demand within the pol-
icy limits is evidence of bad faith). 
172 See Black et al., supra note 22, at 1100-01 (arguing that several countervailing 
pressures motivate insurers with low risk exposure to settle rather than take a chance at 
trial). 
173 As one plaintiffs’ lawyer has stated, 
insurance is very much a factor in settlement amounts, . . . [since] companies 
are [much] more willing to pay with insurance-company money than with 
their own money. . . . [T]hey are very much mindful of setting up the bad-
faith case in their settlement strategy, that they always try to offer within limits 
with exceptions, . . . and when they craft settlement offers that are less than 
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In addition to its veto power over settlement offers, the insurer 
may be able to raise coverage defenses to decrease its share of a set-
tlement, most significantly by threatening to rescind coverage on the 
basis of misrepresentation in the insurance application.174  Corpora-
tions typically submit a copy of their financial statements with their 
application for D&O insurance, and D&O insurance underwriters 
commonly use financial measures derived from the financial state-
ments to price that insurance.175  Thus, fraud in the financial state-
ments can become fraud in the application for insurance, provided 
that the underwriter had insisted that the corporation provide an ap-
plication that incorporated the financial statements and that the in-
surer can prove that the underwriter relied on the fraudulent infor-
mation in the statements.176  According to our participants, D&O 
the total tower, they will craft those offers mindful of the structure of the 
tower so as to put pressure, say, on Level 3 carrier. . . . Any time that you offer 
to settle within limits of Level 3, then what you have got as your ally Levels 4, 
5, and 6 who are pushing Level 3 to settle, and if Level 1 and 2 have already 
decided that it is into the third carrier level, that brings a lot of pressure on 
that third carrier. 
D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #4, supra note 61, at 13-14; see also D&O Interviews, 
Plaintiffs’ Counsel #5, supra note 58, at 23 (“[R]eally good mediators are particularly 
sensitive to insurance carriers and particularly sensitive and aware of putting carriers in 
a bad-faith posture. . . . [T]hat’s the only thing that can really create the leverage.  Be-
cause otherwise, the worst that could happen to them is they pay out insurance money 
that . . . someone is paying a premium for.”).  This is part of the stock in trade of plain-
tiffs’ lawyers any time that a defendant has liability insurance.  See Baker, supra note 57, 
at 223-25 (explaining how plaintiffs’ lawyers craft settlement offers to place pressure on 
insurers).
174 One plaintiffs’ lawyer described it as follows: 
 Q. Do you feel like [insurers] use [coverage defenses] in settlement nego-
tiations? 
 A.  Oh, yes. 
 Q.  Because they say, “Hey, we have this good coverage defense.”  Is that 
meaningful to you? 
 . . . . 
 A.  Absolutely, because I mean it’s a credible threat.
D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #3, supra note 44, at 38-39. 
175 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 514-16 (detailing the financial features, 
such as “the prospective insured’s industry and maturity, its market capitalization, vola-
tility, and various accounting ratios,” which “enable underwriters to form an initial es-
timate of a prospective insured’s exposure to shareholder litigation risk” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
176 See, e.g., Cutter & Buck, Inc. v. Genesis Ins. Co., 144 F. App’x 600, 601-02 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that Genesis had a right to rescind because misrepresentations in the in-
surance application by its signor could be imputed to other directors and officers). 
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insurers only rarely use a rescission defense to avoid paying at all, but 
they do use the rescission defense to reduce the amount that they will 
pay to settle a securities class action.177  As described frankly by one 
claims manager, “[W]hat happens is nine times out of ten . . . the lar-
ger the fraud, [the more] you are going to get a discount on your 
limit.  You are going to cash in essentially your coverage case.”178
The rarity of complete rescission can be explained, in part, by the 
adverse market impact that attends a carrier with a reputation for re-
scission.179  The public-company D&O insurance world is small; the 
buyers are well-informed and willing to pay what it takes to get the 
best coverage, as we explored in detail in prior work.180  Not only 
would individual insureds hesitate to work with such a carrier, but so 
too would insurance brokers, leading to a more drastic and immediate 
loss of underwriting business.  Rescinded policies not only hurt bro-
kers’ reputations with their client base, but also raise liability issues for 
the brokerage firm, leading the broker to place policies with carriers 
that are less likely to rescind.181  Thus, it is not easy, from a business 
perspective, for insurers to pursue a misrepresentation defense all the 
way through to rescission. 
177 See, e.g., D&O Interviews, Claims Head #3, supra note 127, at 42-43. 
178 Id.
179 See D&O Interviews, Claims Head #5, supra note 136, at 69 (“Genesis success-
fully rescinded Cutter & Buck.  That was a huge nail in their coffin.  Brokers talked 
about that endlessly.  They pulled accounts from them and wouldn’t put new business 
with them.”).
180 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 24, at 1828 (explaining that “[t]he cost of the 
premium [of D&O insurance] will be worth incurring when it is less costly to the firm 
than other forms of contingent financing” in the event of shareholder litigation).  
Moreover, almost every time insurance-company lawyers develop a new tactic or de-
fense, the D&O underwriters prepare a new insurance-policy form that explicitly pro-
vides the coverage currently in dispute and thus protects D&O policyholders on a pro-
spective basis.  The most recent examples are “nonrescindable” D&O insurance 
policies and a new endorsement that explicitly provides coverage for a category of 
claims that is hotly contested:  section 11 disgorgement actions.  Tom Baker & Sean J. 
Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Broker #2, at 2 (Nov. 6, 2008) (unpublished 
interviews, on file with authors). 
181 As described by one of our participants, 
[A]t some point the brokers would stop bringing business, because they were 
just too much of a hassle to deal with, and . . . every time you raise a rescission 
issue, you raise a broker [liability] issue, and you know, as long as it is an in-
termediary-driven market, the brokers are going to help steer where the busi-
ness goes. 
D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #2, supra note 93, at 11. 
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A second potential coverage defense that has received significant 
attention in the academic literature—the fraud exclusion—may have 
less impact than has been previously reported.  All D&O policies ex-
clude payments resulting from fraudulent acts on the part of insureds.  
The exclusion has traditionally been subject to a “final adjudication” 
condition that obligates the insurer to fund the criminal and civil de-
fense of directors or officers unless and until the fraud is finally adju-
dicated in the proceeding for which coverage is sought.182  Because 
shareholder litigation almost always is settled—and, therefore, not ad-
judicated in the proceeding for which coverage is sought—the fraud 
exclusion does not narrow the D&O insurance policy to the extent 
that a simple reading of the D&O insurance policy might suggest.183
This dynamic is well understood, and other researchers have used 
it to help explain why securities class actions almost always settle.184
182 See JOHN H. MATHIAS, JR. ET AL., DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY: PREVEN-
TION, INSURANCE AND INDEMNIFICATION § 8.04, at 8-13 to 8-14 (release 7 2004) (col-
lecting cases holding that “[i]f the exclusion requires a final adjudication, that adjudi-
cation must take place in the underlying action for which coverage is sought”); see also
Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 794 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that the final-
adjudication language requires an insurance company to “pay loss as the insured in-
curs legal obligation for such loss, subject to the requirement that the insured reim-
burse any monies received if it is subsequently determined in a judicial proceeding 
that he engaged in active and deliberate dishonesty”).  Some more recent policies con-
tain broader fraud exclusions, but these exclusions have not yet been tested.  See
MATHIAS, JR. ET AL., supra, at 8-16 (suggesting that policyholders contest such exclu-
sions on the basis that they render the coverage illusory).  Our participants confirmed 
that the adjudication-in-fact requirement takes most of the teeth out of the fraud ex-
clusion.  See, e.g., D&O Interviews, Claims Head #1, supra note 126, at 45-46 (noting 
that the fraud exclusion is “[r]aised all the time,” but “[r]arely . . . ever actually trig-
gered” because of the adjudication-in-fact requirement).  During the “hard market” 
years of 2002 to 2005, some D&O insurers began to use a broader exclusion, without 
the final-adjudication language, but many corporations were able to insist on the tradi-
tional language even during that period.  See Baker & Griffith, supra note 24, at 1805
(reporting that insurance-market conditions would inhibit insurers’ ability to insist on 
the broader term, and that brokers confirm that the final-adjudication language is al-
most always available). 
183 See MATHIAS ET AL., supra note 182, at 8-15 (noting that the application of the 
final-adjudication provision “drastically diminishes the force and effect of the [actual 
fraud] exclusion”). 
184 See Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 398 (D. Del. 2002) 
(holding that a deliberate fraud exclusion should not apply to securities claims since 
such an exclusion would essentially eliminate coverage); Black et al., supra  note 22, at 
1100 (“D&O policies typically stipulate that the insurer cannot unreasonably withhold 
consent to a settlement that the policyholder favors.”); Mary E. McCutcheon, Directors 
and Officers Liability Insurance:  Tensions Between Corporate and Individual Insureds, 3 INT’L
J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 148, 152 (2006) (observing that the requirement of a 
“final adjudication” before an exclusion can be enforced makes it difficult for insurers 
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Our difference with their explanation is one of degree.  The “final ad-
judication” provision may contribute to some defendants’ incentive to 
settle—for fear that their insurance would disappear if the case were 
to go to trial.  But monitoring counsel explained to us that they be-
lieve that, in most cases, there would be defendants whose behavior 
would meet the recklessness standard required for liability, but who 
were too peripheral to the fraud to come within the scope of the ex-
clusion.  As a result, the insurer would still have to pay even if a jury 
were to find intentional fraud.185
Moreover, plaintiffs’ lawyers report that the fraud exclusion leads 
them to plead strategically, crafting their pleadings to avoid coming 
within the exclusion.186  Pleading intentional fraud would give the 
D&O insurers a bargaining chip that they could use in the settlement 
negotiations.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers are not anxious to give liability insur-
ers bargaining chips, so they construct their case around allegations of 
reckless conduct, further reducing the effect of the fraud exclusion on 
settlement values. 
to refuse to indemnify defendants); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit:  Litigation 
Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 57 (1991) (reporting that as long as a 
claim is settled, insurers cannot seek an adjudication of guilt and thereby avoid paying 
the claim). 
185 See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Monitoring 
Counsel #1, at 13 ( Jan. 24, 2006) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [here-
inafter D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #1] (“There is also severability of exclu-
sions, which means that there is always an individual for whom the exclusion won’t ap-
ply, which means that the carrier’s on the hook . . . .”). 
186 Id., Interview with Plaintiffs’ Counsel #2, at 34 (May 3, 2007) [hereinafter D&O 
Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #2] (describing a case “where the fraud was too good, 
and the judge voided the insurance policies on grounds of fraud and inducement.  So 
we end up arguing and structuring our arguments more in terms of recklessness, be-
cause recklessness [is sufficient] under 10b-5.  You can’t insure against an intentional 
tort—the old principle”); D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #5, supra note 58, at 23 
(“[We] make sure that we don’t use words like ‘you intentionally cook the books’ or 
‘you did this or you did that.’  We don’t want to provide any sort of out for the insur-
ance carriers.  We are careful to emphasize that recklessness can prove [scienter] and 
that is not intentional . . . .”); D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #6, supra note 59, at 
22 (“Typically, why would you want to plead yourself into a coverage denial that is valu-
able to the case?”); see also Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell:  Intentional Harm and the 
Quest for Insurance Funding, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1721, 1722-23 (1997) (chronicling instances 
of “underlitigation,” where the plaintiff chooses “to plead and prove negligence rather 
than or in addition to intentional tort theories when, absent insurance considerations, 
the plaintiff would either frame the case solely as an intentional tort claim or empha-
size the intentional tort claim,” because most insurance policies exclude harm caused 
intentionally by the insured); cf. Baker, supra note 57, at 223-25 (reporting similar un-
derpleading in bodily injury torts). 
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In summary, D&O insurers have significant control over settle-
ment, but that control is limited by the insurance law rule regarding 
the duty to settle.  In addition, the insurance market limits insurers’ 
ability to rescind policies.  Finally, the final-adjudication clause and 
the fact that the fraud exclusion applies separately to each entity in-
sured under the policy limit the impact of that exclusion.  We now 
turn to the major structural factors that shape the impact of D&O in-
surance on settlement:  limits and layers. 
1.  Limits 
The limits of the D&O insurance policies are an obvious and 
widely noted structural factor affecting the value of securities class ac-
tion settlements.187  Insurance, as we noted above, is seen as relatively 
easy money.188  In addition, reaching for damages beyond insurance 
limits can be difficult, as described by a plaintiffs’ lawyer: 
[I]t is just easier to get money out of an insurance company.  [Paying 
claims] is what they do. . . . [Y]ou are going to have a bigger fight if you 
are trying to get the issuer itself to pay up, just as you know you are going 
to have an even bigger fight if you are trying to squeeze money out of 
individual managers. 189
187 See, e.g., SIMMONS & RYAN, supra note 21, at 20 n.12 (noting that both the rela-
tive merits of the case and the limits of available insurance influence settlement out-
comes); Alexander, supra note 3, at 562 (explaining that the fear of paying damages 
that far exceed policy limits leads insurers to prefer to settle rather than risk going to 
trial and being subject to a bad-faith claim); Black et al., supra note 22, at 1104-05 
(enumerating the factors that motivate plaintiffs’ attorneys to settle within policy limits 
even if they believe the value of the suit to be higher than the policy limit); Romano, 
supra note 184, at 57 (“The plaintiff’s attorney’s calculus [points to settlement].  With a 
settlement, attorneys’ fees will be recovered, as defendants routinely agree not to op-
pose petitions for fees, and, in any event, the benefit the plaintiff has conferred on the 
firm will be recognized in the settlement.  If a claim is litigated, however, there is some 
probability that the plaintiff will lose.”); D&O Interviews, Claims Head #9, supra note 
14, at 20 (describing how plaintiffs are influenced by policy limits when calculating set-
tlement demands). 
188 See supra note 164 (quoting a defense counsel, monitoring counsel, and claims 
head to the effect that it is easier to obtain money from insurance companies than 
from the insured). 
189 D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #7, supra note 59, at 15; accord D&O Inter-
views, Defense Counsel #3, supra note 136, at 34 (“[M]ost plaintiffs’ lawyers are very 
mindful of the policy limits, and they realize that if they are reaching beyond the pol-
icy, this is a different case. . . . [If] you talk about the company coffers, people are go-
ing to resist heavily, . . . [but] the company doesn’t care about the insurance com-
pany’s money.”). 
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Whether insurance money is easy money or not, it drives settle-
ments.  Indeed, one of our plaintiffs’-lawyer participants suggested 
that one way to avoid securities litigation was to buy very little D&O 
insurance.190  Clearly, this was facetious advice; a highly solvent under-
insured company might be as desirable a target as an adequately in-
sured company.  But the point of the comment was plain:  we sue for 
the insurance.  As a result, insurance limits can serve as an anchor for 
settlement amounts. 
If, as is generally the case, D&O insurance limits are significantly 
lower than potential investor losses,191 then average settlements will 
tend to be pulled down to a range closer to typical policy limits.  Aver-
age settlement amounts thus reflect trends in D&O insurance policies 
as much as they do the severity of corporate fraud.  Thus, in a period 
such as the late 1990s and early 2000s—when public-company market 
capitalizations increased, thereby raising potential investor losses in 
securities suits, and D&O coverage limits did not experience a similar 
increase—D&O insurance limits may actually have resulted in less 
damages being paid than legally recognizable losses.192
Insurance, of course, is a hard limit only for insolvent defendants.  
Plaintiffs’ lawyers occasionally claimed to be more or less indifferent 
to insurance if the corporate defendant was financially strong.193  In-
deed, there are settlements in excess of the limits of the D&O insur-
190 See D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #7, supra note 59, at 44-45 (“In my mind 
the amount of D&O coverage . . . does impact a group of cases depending upon vari-
ous economic aspects of what is going on.  There are a class of cases where as a practi-
cal matter, it’s going to be nearly impossible to get more than the amount of insurance 
coverage . . . .”). 
191 See supra text accompanying note 22 (describing average D&O insurance limits 
for mid- and large-cap companies).  Settlement amounts increase much more slowly 
than investor losses increase.  A $100 million loss would result in an expected settle-
ment of 5.1% of the loss value compared to only 1.1% for a $1 billion loss.  In 2007, 
the median investor loss for settled cases was $310 million, compared to $407 million 
in 2006.  With the settlement of several megacases, the average investor loss in 2007 
was $1.75 billion.  PLANCICH ET AL., supra note 21, at 14. 
192 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 535 (postulating that the growth in market 
capitalization as D&O insurance remained stable has resulted in settlements that re-
flect the growth rate of insurance limits, rather than the real cost of liability); D&O In-
terviews, Monitoring Counsel #8, supra note 86, at 45 (“[O]nce you have the top [limits 
of insurance], you can almost always work something off of it.  So here’s something 
that had nothing to do with the merits of the case, and we were able to get some rea-
sonable savings off of our limit because it now became the ceiling and could work 
down from it . . . .”). 
193 See D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #7, supra note 59, at 15 (“If it is a large-
cap company, I don’t care what the policy is . . . .”).
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ance, and defendants sometimes contribute to settlements that are 
less than the amount of the D&O insurance.194  These two categories 
of cases deserve careful attention in any effort to provide a compre-
hensive analysis of securities law in action.  In particular, they suggest 
two important variables that should be considered when using quanti-
tative methods to develop a model of securities class action settle-
ments:  (1) whether the defendant paid part of the settlement; and 
(2) if so, whether that amount was in excess of the amount of available 
insurance.195
Nevertheless, given that insurance funds a large portion of settle-
ments even for solvent corporations and that all our participants re-
ported that insurance is at least somewhat easier to get than damages 
from the corporation itself, it would not be surprising to find that 
plaintiffs, more often than not, are willing to settle within limits.  And 
indeed, this is what we find.  In the words of one plaintiffs’ lawyer, “it 
is great to [make a demand to settle within limits] because then you 
. . . put the insurers in a bad-faith posture potentially. . . . [T]hat really 
does strengthen the hand of the defendants [against the] insurers.”196
Defense lawyers confirmed this dynamic.197
Indeed, plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers alike suggested that they 
have a common adversary in the insurer and a common objective in 
persuading the insurance company to pay out their limits.  In the 
words of one plaintiffs’ lawyer, 
I can think of at least three times in the last two years that I have had a 
defense counsel say to me, “We could settle this, but the carrier is giving 
194 See, e.g., Thomas O. Gorman et al., Securities Class Actions and Derivative Litiga-
tion:  Issues that Keep Corporate Counsel Awake at Night, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 
37 (reporting that defendants are increasingly paying part of the settlement, with 
WorldCom directors paying more than 40% of the total settlement); Janet McFarland, 
The Soaring Cost of a Boardroom Safety Net, GLOBE AND MAIL (Can.), Feb. 23, 2006, at B12 
(reporting that directors in the WorldCom and Enron cases paid part of the settlement 
out of their own pockets). 
195 Cases with payments in excess of the limits are very large settlements, and, all 
other things being equal (most importantly, the size of the investor loss at issue), a case 
with a large settlement seems less likely to be frivolous than a case with a small settle-
ment. See Choi, supra note 9, at 1494 n.142 (citing literature treating low-value settle-
ments as nuisance settlements). 
196 D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #6, supra note 59, at 10; see also D&O Inter-
views, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #2, supra note 186, at 19; D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel 
#8, supra note 70, at 38-39. 
197 See D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #3, supra note 136, at 35 (“[I]f you are a 
defendant, you want a policy-limits demand because that is what puts you in a position 
to say, ‘You can now settle this case without hurting me, and I demand you do it’ . . . .”). 
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me a hard time you know and this is all an off-the-record conversation, 
etc., etc., but if you want to write a letter like this or you want to do that,” 
or “Listen, when we go to the mediation session, I am going to have 
these two guys from the carrier there.  I suggest you say in your presenta-
tion X, Y, and Z.”  I mean they script it for me.198
Although collusion between plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys may 
seem jarring from the defense counsel’s point of view, settling within 
insurance limits, even up to the maximum insurance limits, may be 
the best way of serving the interests of his or her client—the corporate 
defendant.199  And the defense lawyers to whom we talked confirmed 
that much of their role involves persuading the insurer to pay—often by 
warning it of the potentially severe consequences of failing to settle.200
In this regard, a sophisticated plaintiffs’-style-damages analysis that 
includes careful consideration of loss causation may be a tool used by 
defense attorneys against their clients’ insurers.  As candidly described 
by one defense counsel, “[S]ometimes you want to use [plaintiffs’-style 
damages] to scare the insurance company [to] pony up more jack.”201
198 D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #7, supra note 59, at 22. 
199 Consider the following anecdote, described by an insurer’s monitoring counsel: 
I can remember a mediation I was once at, and the mediator was going 
around the room and asking everybody to introduce themselves with the 
plaintiffs’ counsel.  There was a company principal senior officer, and he said, 
“My name is such and such, and I’m”—I can’t remember, the CFO or the 
treasurer or whatever—“and my purpose of being here today is to get the case 
settled for any amount up to and including the full amount of the limit.” 
D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #8, supra note 86, at 29-30. 
200 One claims head described the scenario in the following exchange: 
 A.  You know, asserting that the failure to consent to the settlement has 
been made in bad faith is something which is, you know, an occurrence that 
people are used to in this arena. 
 Q.  It is part of the dance. 
 A.  Well, I wouldn’t call it a dance, because at that point is kind of a—it’s 
more wrestling than a dance. 
D&O Interviews, Claims Head #2, supra note 79, at 33-34; see also D&O Interviews, De-
fense Counsel #1, supra note 44, at 36 (“I think that [the concern about bad faith] 
probably has a lot to do with [how they conduct] business . . . . You know, it’s interest-
ing, when I’m talking to coverage counsel, I always use little terms to remind them 
[about bad faith].  I said, ‘Well your client would like to do this.’ . . . Because they 
know that if their reputation gets out, the only way they pay for all of these is by un-
derwriting more insurance.”); D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #7, supra note 118, 
at 31 (“[S]ome [defense counsel] are not afraid to use the term ‘bad faith.’”). 
201 D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #4, supra note 73, at 19. 
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And, indeed, insurance carriers confirmed that defense lawyers use 
such tactics on them.202
The phenomenon of defense lawyers and plaintiffs’ lawyers coop-
erating to place pressure on liability insurers is hardly unique to secu-
rities class actions.  Indeed, it is a well-recognized feature of personal 
injury litigation.203  But in personal-injury litigation, the insurance 
company chooses the defense lawyer, so the lawyer’s long-term inter-
est in getting business from the insurer moderates this phenomenon 
to at least some extent.204  By contrast, D&O insurers do not choose 
the defense lawyers or control the defense.205  Instead, D&O insurers 
pay the defense costs of the securities defense lawyer that the policy-
202 Consider the following description  by a claims head: 
It is almost routine now to see a plaintiffs’-style-damage analysis filed by Cor-
nerstone and others and given to defense counsel, but many carriers become 
rather cynical about that because most of them are sophisticated enough to 
know that those kinds of plaintiffs’-style-damage analyses really are not a good 
reflection of what the case is truly worth. . . . 
 They are often given to defense counsel who tend to use those, not neces-
sarily with the plaintiffs’ counsel, but with the carriers saying, “Oh my God, we 
hired this big expensive group of economists, and they are smart people and 
they did all this number crunching, and look, there is a catrillion dollars in 
potential damages here.” 
D&O Interviews, Claims Head #6, supra note 44, at 37-38. 
203 See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Ac-
tion, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 280 (2001) (describing the conflict of interest for de-
fense counsel in being paid by the defendant’s insurance provider); Baker, supra note 
173, at 224-25 (“[D]efense lawyers readily acknowledge the alignment of interests be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants with respect to preserving insurance coverage.”); 
Pryor, supra note 186, at 1734 n.44 (discussing agreements of assignment and cove-
nants not to execute between plaintiffs and defendants). 
204 See generally Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Conflicts and Defense Lawyers:  From 
Triangles to Tetrahedrons, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 101 (1997) (detailing the diverse set of in-
centives placed on defense counsel in representing both the insurance companies and 
the insured defendant). 
205 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 24, at 1814-15 (explaining how a D&O insur-
ance policy differs from the industry norm).  Our interviews for this phase of the re-
search confirmed this finding.  The only additional example of defense cost control 
that our participants described to us was refusing to approve separate lawyers for dif-
ferent defendants unless there was an active conflict.  Our insurer- and defense-side 
participants all agreed that D&O insurers otherwise do not have control over defense 
costs, except in the very rare, truly egregious case bordering on lawyer fraud.  E.g.,
D&O Interviews, Claims Head #3, supra note 127, at 49-51; D&O Interviews, Claims 
Head #7, supra note 136, at 29-31; D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #6, supra note 
97, at 19-20; D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #7, supra note 118, at 30-31. 
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holder selects, subject only to the dollar limits of the policy and the 
requirement that defense costs be reasonable.206
In sum, limits serve to anchor settlement amounts.  In some cases 
the limits may pull settlements up, and in other cases they may pull 
settlements down.  When the limits substantially exceed even the up-
per end of the range of prior settlements in comparable cases, the 
limits likely have no impact on the settlement amount.  When the lim-
its are in the lower end of the range of prior settlements or below that 
range, the limits likely reduce the settlement amount.  And when the 
limits are in the upper range of comparable settlements, the limits 
likely increase the settlement.  Our hypothesis is theoretically testable, 
provided that researchers can gain access to reliable information 
about the limits of D&O insurance programs. 
2.  Layers 
The question of limits is fundamentally the question of what 
amount of insurance is available.  But as our participants emphasized, 
“[i]t’s not just amount of insurance, it’s amount and structure.”207  In 
discussing the structural elements of insurance, our participants drew 
our attention to the design of the insurance tower.  In particular, they 
focused on where particular insurers are placed within the tower and, 
more broadly, on the ability of multiple layers in a tower to act as a 
kind of firebreak on settlements. 
D&O insurance is sold in layers.  There is a primary insurance pol-
icy, and there is a series of layers of “excess of loss” insurance policies, 
each of which agrees to pay for claims once the underlying layer is ex-
hausted.  When we investigated insurance purchasing patterns in 
2005, the highest D&O insurance limit that any insurer was willing to 
write on any single company was $25 million, and maximum limits of 
$15 million, $10 million, or even $5 million per insured were common 
206 Baker & Griffith, supra note 24, at 1814.  The two leading D&O insurance carri-
ers maintain lists of “panel counsel” that policyholders generally must use in defending 
securities claims.  The panel-counsel list, however, does not appear to be a cost-saving 
device for carriers, as the most prestigious (read:  expensive) national law firms appear 
on both lists and insurers have not made any arrangement for a discount of their cus-
tomary fee.  This makes D&O panel-counsel arrangements different from insurance-
panel-counsel arrangements in more typical torts contexts, in which the lawyers on the 
panel have agreed to insurance-company payments that are lower than their customary 
fees and to the insurance company’s case-management and billing guidelines.  Id. at 
1817-19. 
207 D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #2, supra note 102, at 1. 
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among the insurers active in the D&O market.  This means that even 
relatively small D&O insurance programs almost always involve multi-
ple layers of insurance policies, usually issued by different insurance 
companies.  There easily can be ten or more insurance companies in-
volved in a securities class action filed against a public company with a 
large D&O program. 
a.  The Arrangement of the Tower 
At the beginning of every case, the working layer of insurance is 
the primary insurer, which generally remains the insurer in charge of 
coordinating with the defense team at least through the hearing of 
the motion to dismiss.  Many cases, in fact, will never reach the layers 
of excess insurance.  Except in a megacase or in a case with extensive 
parallel proceedings, the primary insurance policy—the bottom 
layer—typically is large enough to cover the defense costs for a securi-
ties class action.  As a result, excess layers are unlikely to be interested 
or involved in the early stages of a typical case.208
But some cases, of course, will survive the motion to dismiss.  In 
these cases, the limits of the primary insurer and often the initial lay-
ers of excess are almost certain to be exhausted.  In a D&O insurance 
policy, unlike a typical automobile or general-liability policy, the de-
fense costs count against the limit of the policy.  Well before their  
limits actually are exhausted, these carriers know that they are, in our 
participants’ words, “toast.”209  In this case, a conflict of interest may 
arise among the various layers of insurance within the tower.  Layers of 
excess insurance that may potentially be implicated in the settlement 
will favor an early settlement at any amount that does not reach their 
layer, while the primary and any other excess carriers that are toast will 
prefer to delay settlement so that they can maximize their own returns 
by holding their reserves for as long as they can.  According to one of 
our participants, “if they can drag it out, they can still make money [on 
those reserves].  So they are not in any hurry to pay out.”210
208 See id. (“[R]emember who drives the case.  The case is driven by the primary 
carrier.  It’s very rare that the excess carriers are engaged.”).  But see D&O Interviews, 
Monitoring Counsel #3, supra note 112, at 70-71 (reporting that in recent years insur-
ers higher in the coverage tower have begun participating in conference calls earlier in 
the case). 
209 D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #2, supra note 102, at 1.
210 Id. at 2.  The same participant, a defense lawyer, prided himself on his willing-
ness to settle early if early settlement suited the particular claim.  In such cases, how-
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Of course, this dynamic is subject to the risk of bad-faith liability.  
However, bad-faith liability requires the ability to actually settle the 
case within the limits of the recalcitrant insurer.  The plaintiffs are 
unlikely to be willing to make an offer to settle within the limits of 
policies that everyone agrees are toast.  They are looking for more 
money than that.  So the carriers who are toast and the carriers who 
sit just above them in the tower join in the effort to resist settlement, 
while the plaintiffs’ lawyers, the defense lawyers, and the high-level 
excess carriers push for settlement.211  One mediator described the 
push for settlement as follows: 
[O]ftentimes [I] can say, “I don’t know what the settlement is going to 
be, but it’s going to be at least $50 million,” and then you look at what 
the insurance carrier is, let’s say $100 million, and you look at the fact 
that they are spending $[1] million a month.  Those carriers in the 
higher end of the tower sort of see the hurricane coming, and they know 
that absent sort of a Hail Mary motion to dismiss or summary judgment 
ruling, it is going to be at least a $50 million settlement.  If you don’t set-
tle for two years, we are going to get through $24 million, and so they see 
it coming and they are urging early settlement because it is in their in-
terests at this time since the hurricane won’t get to them . . . and that is 
why those insurers at the top become much more aggressive advocates 
for an early settlement whereas the ones down below know that they are 
toast under any circumstances, whether they get wiped out by the cost of 
defense or wiped out by the minimum $50 million settlement.
212
In that dynamic, the primary carrier’s deeper knowledge of the 
details of the case, as well as the details of settlements in other cases, 
gives them influence over the other insurers.  The primary carrier has 
more information about the case in question because it has been 
working with the defense lawyers from the beginning of the case.  If 
the primary carrier is one of the few insurers with a large market 
share, that carrier will also have more information about the details of 
other settlements as well.  This information gives the primary carriers 
an edge in the settlement discussions, limiting the power of the excess 
carriers to push for early settlement. 
The excess insurers themselves could, of course, remedy this 
structural aspect simply by becoming more involved in earlier stages 
ever, he reported that he often received resistance from insurers who frequently in-
sisted on continuing the procedural fight notwithstanding his advice.  Id.
211 See D&O Roundtable, supra note 57, at 52 (quoting a defense counsel as saying 
that “often what you find is that defense counsel is aligned with an excess layer to try to 
put pressure on a lower layer that won’t exhaust or won’t basically open up the coffers”). 
212 D&O Interviews, Mediator #2, supra note 123, at 16. 
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of claims.  In general, however, they do not do so.213  The exception to 
this general rule may arise when two companies within the same cor-
porate group act as both primary insurer and excess insurer.  In such 
a situation, the primary carrier could protect the limits of its corporate 
affiliate by settling earlier at a lower total amount.  And indeed, our 
participants confirmed that in such cases primary carriers frequently 
are amenable to early settlement.214
In sum, the settlement dynamic is shaped by the structure of the 
tower.  Unless the plaintiffs’ lawyers have determined that they will ac-
cept nothing less than the full amount of the D&O insurance pro-
gram, the lawyers will craft their settlement strategies mindful of the 
limits in the individual layers.  Carriers in the lower layers will be in-
formed that they are toast and should get out of the way, while the 
carrier in the settlement layer is likely to be asked to pay something 
less than the full amount of the policy so that it now has something to 
lose by continuing the litigation.215  Carriers higher in the tower, eager 
213 Those carriers who frequently find themselves in the middle level of the tower 
may find that it is in their particular interest to develop an early and independent as-
sessment of claims.  One carrier in our sample confirmed this:  “[C]arriers [that] tend 
to be in the [middle] excess layer are required to do more of this kind of merit-based, 
detailed analysis to get to what we think is a reasonable result and what is a fair result 
for our insured.”  D&O Interviews, Claims Head #9, supra note 14, at 38. 
214 As one participant recounted, 
I remember one instance where there was a carrier who does a lot of primary 
who happened to be excess in a particular case and was being asked to just 
throw in $100,000.  And the notion was basically to pressure the primary to 
collapse, because if the first layer of excess is throwing in a little bit on top, 
then the implication is that the primary should be exhausted . . . . The re-
sponse from the claims lawyer for that usually primary and now sitting first 
layer excess was, “No, I don’t need authority for just $100,000.  I need author-
ity for this case to settle at $5.1 million, and in order to determine that that’s a 
reasonable settlement.” 
Id. at 28. 
215 A settlement too close to a carrier’s total limits may induce that carrier to take a 
chance on continuing the case to the next motion or the next procedural stage.  See,
e.g., D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #5, supra note 58, at 21 (discussing an example 
where the defendant had $18.5 million in limits and the settlement demand was for 
$17 million, and the insurer just said, “Why don’t I just basically take a chance?”).  As a 
prominent mediator said, 
I’ve done mediations where I simply looked at a plaintiff and said, “Look, if 
you really want to settle this case now, . . . reasonable people can disagree as to 
whether it is a $5, $10, $11 or $12 million case, but the truth is you are not go-
ing to settle this case now unless you give AIG or Chubb some opportunity to 
save some money off their $10 million policy, because if they get the choice of 
tapping themselves out now and paying their $10 million now or continuing 
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to protect their own limits, may pressure the target carrier to accept 
the discount.216  If that carrier agrees to accept the discount, the pres-
sure is then on the carriers lower in the tower to offer up their policy 
limits, at the risk of having to pay more later by virtue of the duty to 
settle.217
b.  Firebreaks 
If increasing settlement demands are like wildfires, then the layers 
within an insurance tower function like firebreaks.218  Each layer 
within an insurance tower represents a new level of insurance in-
volvement, a new monitoring counsel, and a new team of claims man-
agers that must approve the settlement.  At the very least, this chang-
ing of the guard that accompanies the breakthrough into each layer 
of excess insurance adds delay.  It may also increase defense costs as 
insurers, understanding that their limits are likely to be consumed, fail 
to monitor and constrain their costs.219  But perhaps most importantly, 
to pay this fireman becoming toast, you get a pretty easy choice, but if you of-
fer them the opportunity to save $1 million off their policy, they are going to 
be highly incentivized to perhaps get this done.” 
D&O Interviews, Mediator #2, supra note 123, at 14. 
216 See, e.g., D&O Roundtable, supra note 57, at 51 (“I think the vision of the insur-
ance carriers working together is sort of funny, because they are rooting against each 
other.”).
217 See, e.g., Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1175, 1181 
(7th Cir. 1994) (holding the primary insurer liable to an excess insurer in a case in 
which the excess insurer reasonably settled the case above the primary insurer’s policy 
limits, on the grounds that the primary insurer’s earlier failure to settle the case within 
the limits of the primary insurer’s policy breached the duty of good faith). 
218 As one defense counsel stated, 
[I]f there’s a $25 million first layer and there is a case that is going to settle 
around $25 million, sometimes you will tell the plaintiffs, “Look, I can give 
you $25 million assuming the first layer is on board. . . . [B]ut if you want $28 
million, you know, I’m not sure I can get it, and it’s going to slow everything 
down by six months.” 
D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #5, supra note 14, at 9-10; see also D&O Interviews, 
Defense Counsel #2, supra note 102, at 2 (“In a case that’s not Enron or some massive 
fraud case, every time [the plaintiffs] hit another layer, it acts like a firebreak and 
makes it easier to negotiate a settlement.”); D&O Interviews, Mediator #2, supra note 
123, at 15 (referring to the tiers as a “nonmerits savings issue”).  But see Tom Baker & 
Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Mediator #3, at 17 ( July 2, 2007) (un-
published interviews, on file with authors) (reacting to the suggestion of firebreaks be-
tween layers by exclaiming, “It’s a myth!”). 
219 One of the claims heads interviewed explained why carriers would be willing to 
incur such large defense costs: 
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the additional layers of process may act as a break on settlement 
amounts.  One mediator described the process of working through 
layers as follows: 
I work my way up these layers.  Every time I am starting with a new fresh 
person.  And do you have kids who play video games? 
 . . . . 
 And you get to go to a higher level? 
 . . . . 
 A new monster jumps out.  And you slay that one?  All you get is a 
bigger monster?  That’s what it feels like to me. . . . It’s exhausting, and 
they want it to be exhausting.
220
Even plaintiffs’ lawyers readily acknowledged coverage layers as an 
additional burden,221 although they were, in general, more likely to 
downplay their influence in the ultimate outcome.222
The impact of multiple layers is not as simple as more tiers and 
lower settlements:  Consider a hypothetical involving three compa-
[D]epending upon the size of the primary layer, some carriers take the atti-
tude of, “Well, my money is gone.  If I’m a primary carrier and I have a little 
retention below me, and I’ve only got $5 million worth of coverage, then I’ve 
got big expensive Law Firm X and I’ve got co-counsel from big expensive Law 
Firm Y.  You know, my $5 million is gone as soon as I lose the motion to dis-
miss.”
 . . . . 
 So you sometimes observe those carriers as kind of going to sleep, not doing 
anything, just kind of rubberstamping:  “Yeah, do whatever you want.” 
D&O Interviews, Claims Head #6, supra note 44, at 23-24. 
220 D&O Interviews, Mediator #1, supra note 142, at 32-33. 
221 See, e.g., D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #8, supra note 70, at 35 (“[A pro-
gram with layers] really adds a burden to the situation.  I think that truthfully instead 
of three layers of $5 million for a $15 million program, you could . . . probably pay less 
if you had fifteen single million-dollar things.”), 
222 See D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #3, supra note 44, at 48 (“[The structure 
of the tower matters] because you’ve got sort of a separate negotiation at each level.  
Sometimes it can work to your advantage.”); D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #6, 
supra note 59, at 11 (noting that a layered program “makes it very difficult particularly 
if you have a recalcitrant level in the middle . . . . [But] I don’t think it really saves 
them at the end of the day.  It just makes the process less pleasant . . . . I don’t know 
that it changes the outcome very much”); D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #7, supra
note 59, at 16 (acknowledging that the structure of the policy is a factor influencing 
settlement, but stating that the structure of the policy is a “smaller factor than . . . the 
damages and the risks and all that. . . . [When] you have a case that you really think is 
worth $40 million, you are not going to settle for $12 million because that is the first 
layer”). 
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nies—A, B, and C—each facing a factually identical securities claim, 
and each with identical aggregate insurance limits.  The only differ-
ence between them is the structure of their tiers.  Company A has a 
four-tier tower consisting of a $5 million dollar primary policy, a first 
excess of $5 million, a second excess of $10 million, and a third excess 
of $20 million.  Meanwhile, Company B has a single $40 million pol-
icy, and Company C has what would probably be most typical:  a larger 
primary layer of $20 million and two excess layers of $10 million.  In 
this example, it is easy to see how Company A’s multiple layers of cov-
erage could act as firebreaks contributing to a lower overall settlement 
than that paid by Companies B or C.223  Although several of our par-
ticipants acknowledged this effect of multiple layers on settlement224
and some defense lawyers may even recommend adoption of such a 
structure for strategic reasons,225 it is likely that most companies with 
multiple tiers have them serendipitously because their underwriters 
made a decision to limit their exposure to any one risk.226  Once again, 
we note that our hypothesis could be easily tested quantitatively if data 
on the structure of corporate D&O programs were publicly available.227
223 See Boris Feldman, The Veil of Tiers:  Shareholder Lawsuits and Strategic Insurance 
Layers, RISK MGMT., Apr. 1997, at 77, 86, available at http://www.borisfeldman.com/ 
Veil_of_Tiers.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (offering a similar example, noting that 
Company A’s structure of layers “would provide strong, natural firebreaks at $5 million 
and $10 million,” and concluding that “[i]t’s a safe bet that the identical claim against 
[Company A] would settle for less with that structure” than it would have if it had the 
structure of either Company B or Company C). 
224 Some participants provided a similar numerical example that contrasted com-
panies with different tiered structures.  See, e.g., D&O Interviews, Mediator #2, supra
note 123, at 15 (“[Even if] the case is a $20 million to $30 million case . . . that case 
might settle for $18 million because the only two insurance companies you can get to 
tap themselves out are the primary and the first excess.”). 
225 See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 223, at 84, 86, 88 (recommending strategic tiering 
at the outset in order to induce favorable settlements in the event of litigation). 
226 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 504 (describing the tendency of under-
writers, after the scandals of Enron and WorldCom, to reduce their individual risk ex-
posure by selling smaller amounts of insurance to more companies). 
227 For a thoughtful treatment of the impact that the structure of excess insurance 
programs can have in the asbestos mass-settlement context, see Michelle J. White, Why 
the Asbestos Genie Won’t Stay in the Bankruptcy Bottle, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1319, 1334-36 
(2002), observing that carriers in low layers have no incentive to take an aggressive ap-
proach to weeding out no-injury claims when it is clear that the damages incurred in 
the serious injury claims will exceed the carriers’ limits. 
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C.  Other Incentives:  Defendants and Counsel 
No discussion of the effects of insurance would be complete if it 
left out the basic incentives of the other participants—the corporate 
defendant, the defense attorney, and the plaintiffs’ lawyer—leading 
up to settlement.  As described by our participants, defendants typi-
cally favor settlement for reasons related to other business exigencies.  
By contrast, insurers typically resist settlement to boost their invest-
ment income, while defense attorneys delay settlement, at least to 
some degree, so that they can maximize billable hours on the case.  
Plaintiffs’ lawyers have the same incentive as defense attorneys under 
the lodestar approach to attorneys’-fees calculations, subject to cash-
flow pressures attributable to the fact that plaintiffs’ lawyers do not get 
paid until settlement. 
The business exigencies of a corporate defendant may lead the 
defendant to press its insurer for settlement when, on a rational-actor 
model, it may be more advantageous to continue to resist settlement.  
These exigencies tend to cluster around significant corporate events, 
such as a major corporate transaction, a change of CEO, a change in 
accounting, or a change of auditor.  Each of these events may induce 
the corporation to settle for reasons external to the litigation itself.  
The merger partner or new CEO, for example, may want to eliminate 
contingent liabilities created by the ancien regime, and a new auditing 
firm may want to close the books on old liabilities.  Our participants 
confirmed that a range of such motivations are often the driving force 
ultimately bringing the corporation to the table.  For example, 
what drives a settlement? . . . [C]orporate events—a company may be in-
terested in a merger [or] acquisition.  They may be issuing stock.  They 
may be interested in being taken over, going private, whatever.  Those 
things will also cause companies to want to clean up litigation.  [In addi-
tion,] a company could be taking a significant write-off for unrelated 
reasons in a particular quarter and throwing litigation reserve on top of 
that might be a problem because they are already showing a loss.  So 
they might as well clean up in that period.
228
228 D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #5, supra note 58, at 11-12.  Or, as de-
scribed by a mediator, 
[T]here are many different kinds of pressure points.  They can range from . . . 
the defendant issuer or company want[ing] to make an acquisition or divesti-
ture, . . . [to the fact that] if the litigation is material enough, . . . the litigation 
itself has to be disclosed and discussed in filings that the company is coming 
up against a quarterly filing where they have to say something about the expo-
sure in this litigation if it is big enough.  I can think of one case where the set-
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Or again, 
it could be that they want to sell the company and they want to get every-
thing behind them.  It could be that they . . . are going to get rid of the 
CEO for other reasons or the CEO is going to retire and they want to have 
everything happen on the watch of the old CEO.  There are a lot of situa-
tions like that where people want to clean things up.  Sometimes . . . they 
could have a problem with the government in another area.  You know, if 
you are a drug company and you have a problem with the drug or some-
thing like that and then they say, “OK, well, let’s clean everything up.”
229
Such business exigencies, it would seem, tend to lead to higher set-
tlements.  As corporate defendants move to settle the litigation sooner 
rather than later, they also pressure insurers to get it over with.  In the 
event that the insurers resist, defendants agree to fund a larger por-
tion of the settlement themselves in order to get the deal done.230  On 
the other hand, there may be other business exigencies, such as busi-
ness failure and approaching insolvency, that encourage quick settle-
ment without necessarily increasing settlement amounts.231
The urge to settle among corporate defendants—which our par-
ticipants suggested is nearly universal once the plaintiffs’ claim sur-
vives the motion to dismiss,232 even in the absence of business exigen-
cies favoring settlement—is to some extent tempered by the D&O 
tlement for the company in this case was in the billions of dollars, and that was 
the pressure point.  They were at risk of making another, new false statement, 
and you know to make the disclosure and not have the case settled would put 
enormous pressure on them.  Or it could be [that] . . . something happened 
in an SEC matter. 
D&O Interviews, Mediator #1, supra note 142, at 56; see also D&O Roundtable, supra
note 57, at 36 (using the example of a bank that suffers a loss at the same time that the 
housing market suffers a downturn as an illustration of a typical loss-causation assess-
ment, and noting that the question that must be asked is whether the bank failed “be-
cause the housing industry itself is falling apart?  Was the bank maybe the cause of the 
housing industry falling apart?”). 
229 D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #5, supra note 14, at 14-15. 
230 See D&O Interviews, Claims Head #6, supra note 44, at 21-22 (stating that insur-
eds sometimes take the position that “we are about to do this big transaction.  We are 
selling the company, so we have to get rid of this in order to maximize the ability to sell 
the company to somebody else”). 
231 As noted by our participants, an insolvent entity cannot contribute to the set-
tlement. See, e.g., D&O Interviews, Claims Head #3, supra note 127, at 76-77.  By con-
trast, a defendant with a “very substantial cash position . . . [will] have the effect of . . . 
increasing or tending to increase the settlement fight because they know there’s more 
to be gotten.”  Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Defense 
Counsel #7, at 12 (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) [hereinafter D&O In-
terviews, Defense Counsel #7]. 
232 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
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insurer’s reluctance to settle.  In addition to the sale of policies, an in-
surance company’s profitability is derived from its investment returns.  
Other things being equal, the faster an insurance company pays out its 
reserves, the less investment return it realizes.  Every insurance carrier 
thus has an incentive to delay paying claims in order to maximize in-
vestment returns. 
Most of our participants confirmed this dynamic.  “Insurance car-
riers’ profitability is driven by two things,” one defense lawyer pointed 
out:  “[T]heir payout ratio and what [they are] earning on their in-
vestments.  They can have a very high payout ratio and be very profit-
able [because of their investments].  So they’re never in a hurry to pay 
out.”233  On this point, again, plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers see eye to 
eye.  In the words of a prominent plaintiffs’ lawyer, “Most [insurers] will 
set very high reserves on these claims internally and then decide when 
they have to reverse them by really settling the case for less than that re-
serve . . . so that they can report a higher income.”234  Some of the in-
surers we interviewed, perhaps unsurprisingly, denied these suspicions:
[Y]ou wouldn’t have to look too long or hard to recognize that you are 
not making money by investing with interest rates the way they are.  
That’s not anyone’s motivation from the insurer’s side.  The insurer 
would be far better making a reasonable settlement at an early time and 
building good will . . . .”
235
Regardless of how low the investment returns may be, however, com-
mon sense suggests that, other things being equal, the longer a carrier 
is able to keep its reserves invested, the better its results will be.  As we 
have explained, the layered nature of D&O insurance may increase 
this incentive to delay. 
Thus, the corporate defendant’s incentive to rush to settle the 
claim is tempered by the insurer’s incentive to delay.  Given a signifi-
cant business exigency, such as a merger or change of CEO, the cor-
porate defendant may induce the insurer to accept an earlier-than-
optimal settlement by offering to contribute a larger portion of the 
overall settlement or by offering to pay an inflated insurance premium 
at the next renewal.  In any event, the corporate defendant’s incen-
tives tend to increase settlement values and, after the motion to dis-
miss, promote earlier settlements, while the insurer’s incentive tends 
to push in the other direction. 
233 D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #2, supra note 102, at 1. 
234 D&O Interviews, Plaintiffs’ Counsel #5, supra note 58, at 20. 
235 D&O Interviews, Claims Head #9, supra note 14, at 12. 
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Many of our participants said that the lawyers involved in the case 
on both sides also have an incentive to delay settlement:  defense law-
yers so that they can continue billing the file,236 and plaintiffs’ lawyers 
so that they can show sufficient effort to justify a large fee under a 
lodestar approach.237  Defense lawyers are subject to similar accusa-
tions in other litigation contexts.238  Plaintiffs’ lawyers more typically 
are paid a percentage of the recovery in other contexts, so this incen-
tive to delay may be a special feature of securities class action litiga-
tion.  This incentive is one reason that commentators have investi-
gated using an auction approach to select class representatives.239
While not a major focus of our research, the reports about plaintiffs’ 
236 See, e.g., D&O Interviews, Monitoring Counsel #7, supra note 118, at 30 (“The 
defense counsel, however, and I don’t mean to be overly cynical, but you get cynical 
after you’ve done this stuff for a while.  Defense counsel will work a case until they have 
decided they have earned enough money and then they will tell you it’s time to settle 
. . . .”); D&O Interviews, Defense Counsel #7, supra note 231, at 20, 26 (noting that “de-
fense lawyers’ compensation is a function of their billable hours and they have an in-
centive to take these cases downstream,” and concluding that “as a defendant’s lawyer, 
we can litigate this all you want and I’m happy to because I can use the billings”). 
237 See, e.g., Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, D&O Interviews, Interview with Defense 
Counsel #8, at 4 ( July 25, 2007) (unpublished interviews, on file with authors) 
(“[P]laintiffs’ lawyers would love to settle a case as soon as possible in the litigation, but 
often they will be aware of the fact that they need to get their settlement approved by a 
court. . . . [T]hey believe that they must do some amount of work and have some sort 
of a paper record in order to get the settlement approved by a court.”); D&O Inter-
views, Monitoring Counsel #1, supra note 185, at 6 (reporting that “in jurisdictions 
where there is a lodestar approach to fee awards, there tend not to be early settle-
ments, because [this] rewards the plaintiffs’ lawyers working the file—notwithstanding 
. . . an acknowledgment on all parties that there is decent liability”).
238 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 204, at 110-11 (reporting on lawyers’ incentives and 
potential conflicts of interest); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Commodification of Insurance De-
fense Practice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 2053, 2064 (2006) (“[F]or open-file billing, there is an 
incentive to keep a file open at least until costs have been covered.”); Herbert M. 
Kritzer, Defending Torts:  What Should We Know?, J. TORT L., 2007, at 7, 
http://www.bepress.com/jtl/vol1/iss3/art3/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2009) (observing 
that there is a “common perception among plaintiffs lawyers . . . that . . . settlement is 
not likely until the defense counsel has had the chance to ‘run the meter’ for a while 
to build up a fee,” but noting that this has not been carefully studied and that there 
are countervailing incentives). 
239 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Questionable Case for Using Auctions to Select 
Lead Counsel, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 889 (2002) (analyzing drawbacks to using auctions to 
select class counsel, including minimizing the percentage of recovery paid to plaintiffs’ 
counsel); Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block:  Evaluating the Selection of Class Coun-
sel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (2002) (scrutinizing the claimed benefits of lead-
counsel auctions); Andrew K. Niebler, In Search of Bargained-For Fees for Class Action 
Plaintiffs’ Lawyers:  The Promise and Pitfalls of Auctioning the Position of Lead Counsel, 54 
BUS. LAW. 763 (1999) (suggesting improvements to the auction system designed to 
modify quality and cost incentives faced by counsel). 
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lawyers’ incentive to delay support the auction idea.  Other “business 
exigencies” on the plaintiffs’-counsel side include whether the firm 
has other cases in the pipeline and, if so, cash-flow demands related to 
those other cases.240
IV. DISCUSSION
We can now put forward a set of propositions, derived from our 
qualitative research, to illuminate the problem of assessing the role of 
the merits in securities class actions. 
First, as we are hardly the first to observe, there is very little adju-
dication beyond the initial motion to dismiss.  Securities class actions 
almost never reach trial, and dispositive summary judgment rulings 
are nearly as rare.241  Neither the basic facts of the claim nor the tech-
nical details of the damages model are tested by a neutral arbiter.  
This absence of adjudication deprives future claimants and defen-
dants of authoritative guidance.242  In the absence of such adjudica-
tion, the weight of facts is unclear and a variety of damages models are 
equally plausible.  This leads not only to significant variation in dam-
ages models, but also to an inability on the part of a litigator to confi-
dently conclude that the counterparty’s assertions can be disproved.  
Without such adjudication, there is no appeal to an objective fact 
finder, and as a result, no external judgment of the truth of a claim or 
the credibility of a damages theory. 
Second, essentially all securities class actions that survive a motion 
to dismiss are settled with a payment to the class.243  This means that 
the motion to dismiss is, in an important sense, a dispositive decision.  
Indeed, in most cases, it is the only “dispositive” decision that a court 
will make.244  But the denial of a motion to dismiss indicates only that 
240 See D&O Roundtable, supra note 57, at 45 (“[D]o you need to fund the engine 
while you are waiting for the huge pot of money?”). 
241 See Choi et al., supra note 78 (noting that since the passage of the PSLRA, 100% 
of securities class actions have been either dismissed or settled). 
242 The most obvious gaps are rules regarding the application of loss-causation 
rules to facts, but lawyers also have no evidentiary basis for comparing the views of the 
mock juries that they sometimes convene with those of real juries. 
243 See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the roles of the motion to dismiss and the mo-
tion for summary judgment). 
244 Depending upon the circuit, class certification may involve some consideration 
of the claim’s underlying merits and may be seen as a dispositive ruling.  See supra notes 
73-77 and accompanying text.  The only other dispositive ruling that the court will 
make is to approve the final settlement negotiated by the parties and their insurers.  
The approval of settlement is a pro forma ruling. 
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the plaintiffs have fit their allegations into a recognized legal theory.  
The decision on the motion to dismiss does not render judgment on 
the truth of the allegations, nor does it provide any guide to the 
amount of the damages that the defendants would be required to pay 
if those allegations were proven.245  It is not the same, in other words, 
as final adjudication on the merits of the claim. 
Third, settlements are funded largely, and often entirely, by D&O 
insurance.  This means that, in most cases, insurance companies are 
the real interested parties.  Since their primary interest lies in mini-
mizing payouts throughout most of the claims process, they are in-
volved in contesting the plaintiffs’ claim.246  As a result, it is customary 
to treat insurers as though they are stepping into the shoes of the de-
fendant.  Yet, once the motion to dismiss is denied, the defendants 
will favor settlement as long as the plaintiffs are willing to accept an 
insurance-funded settlement.  At this point the insurer, to some ex-
tent, steps out of the shoes of the defendant and steps into the shoes 
of the fact finder and decides whether the settlement outcome 
adopted by the plaintiffs and defendants fairly represents the dis-
counted present value of the claim.247  The outcomes of securities class 
actions are driven, in other words, not by the opinion of a judge or 
the decision of a jury, but by the consent of the insurers. 
Both plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers cast their arguments with a 
view towards the insurer.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers report that they are care-
ful not to plead facts giving rise to a coverage defense—for example, 
facts indicating intentional fraud—and that they shape their settle-
ment offers to create pressure on the insurance tower.  They also de-
scribe settlement meetings where the defense counsel essentially 
scripted the plaintiffs’ arguments in order to induce the insurers to 
settle.  Likewise, insurers describe how defendants change their char-
245 Cf. Choi, supra note 9, at 1472-73 (arguing that the stay of discovery until after 
the motion to dismiss may chill the filing of some meritorious claims). 
246 See supra text accompanying notes 155-156. 
247 Often, we found, the calculation performed by any one insurer at this point is, 
more simply, whether the discounted present value of the claim exceeds the limits of 
that insurer’s policy.  If so, that settlement control is passed to the next layer of insur-
ance within the tower, which then becomes the working layer.  See, e.g., D&O Inter-
views, Monitoring Counsel #6, supra note 97, at 12-13 (“The old timers in the industry 
really can’t believe that this is happening, but it is happening more and more . . . 
[and] there’s no chance that they are going to say anything because the ad damnum is 
so big and the defense costs are going to say goodbye. . . . [They are just going to] turn 
to the next up and say ‘I’m done.  I’m about to roll.  You want to take over?  What do 
you want to do?’  So you politely leave it to the next carrier.”).
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acterization of a claim—from defensible to more-or-less indefensible 
and, therefore, worthy of settlement.  Defense lawyers confirm that 
they adjust their characterization of the facts regarding liability and 
damages in order to keep insurers moving toward settlement.  All of 
these tactics are designed to move the insurer. 
Fourth, in deciding whether to approve a settlement offer, the in-
surer obviously cannot be guided entirely by the representations of 
the parties, both of whom, by that point, strongly favor settlement for 
their own purposes.  Therefore the insurer will look to the only objec-
tive information that exists regarding the appropriateness of the set-
tlement offer:  other settlements.248  Insurers have a general sense of 
the range of settlement values as a percentage of investor loss, and 
they update that general sense by closely following securities class ac-
tion settlements.  Yet by looking to other settlements, insurers are 
bargaining not in the shadow of the law, but in the shadow of prior 
bargains, and are at a further remove from decisions by judges or ju-
ries on the merits. 
Fifth, the practice among insurers of “cashing out,” or dropping 
potential coverage defenses, in exchange for greater contributions to 
settlement from the defendant corporations has interesting implica-
tions for the relationship between deterrence and insurance.  For one 
thing, it allows us to infer that the more a corporation contributes to a 
within-limits settlement, the more likely there is to be actual fraud un-
derlying the plaintiffs claim (of course taking into account alternative 
reasons for a within-limits payment such as deductibles, coinsurance 
and the presence or absence of an insolvent insurer in the D&O pro-
gram).  Although above-limits settlements themselves may be sugges-
tive of meritorious claims, the inference to be drawn from defendant 
contributions may be strongest when the case settles within the total 
limits of the D&O policy.  Within-limits settlement suggests that cash-
ing out the insurers’ coverage defense, and not the sheer size of the 
investor loss, would explain the defendant’s contribution to the set-
tlement.249  Because the insurers’ ability to extract a contribution from 
the corporate defendant turns on the quality of the coverage defense, 
which itself often turns on bad acts by the defendants, the more the 
248 “Objective” is used here to describe information not fed to the insurer by  
plaintiffs’ or defense counsel. 
249 The presence of business reasons to settle quickly could be an alternative ex-
planation for a within-limits contribution by the defendant.  A measure of the time be-
tween filing of suit and settlement would be one, admittedly crude, way to control for 
that variable. 
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defendant corporation contributes to a within-limits settlement, the 
more likely it is to have engaged in fraud.  Defendant contribution to 
within-limits settlements thus provides another, potentially measur-
able, proxy for merit, which could be tested if only the quantitative 
data on settlement structure and funding were available. 
In summary, as expected, we cannot draw a strong conclusion 
about whether the merits do or do not matter.  Our participants re-
ported that they do pay attention to “merits,” variously understood, 
but they also reported that nonmerit factors contribute significantly to 
settlement.  For example, our participants’ focus on “sex appeal” in 
settlement discussions supports the claim that litigants pay some atten-
tion to merit-related factors.  But sex appeal is, at best, a loose proxy 
for merits and, like all proxies, both over- and underinclusive; at 
worst, sex appeal is a kind of smear campaign, focusing on sensational 
facts that distort reality and induce defendants to settle in order to 
avoid further embarrassment.250
Although we must remain agnostic on the question of just how 
much the merits ultimately matter, our research does have implica-
tions for how to make the merits matter more.  The sections that fol-
low outline these implications. 
A.  More Adjudication 
Perhaps the most obvious problem in deciding whether securities 
class actions are meritorious is the fact that such claims are almost 
never decided by a judge or jury; cases typically settle.  In one sense, of 
course, this is a success of the civil justice system; judicial resources are 
spared and compromises are reached that, to some degree, accom-
modate both sides.  As we have seen, however, there is so little adjudi-
cation in the securities law context that parties seeking to settle a 
claim are guided not by adjudicated cases, but rather by other settle-
ments.  The settlements being used as points of reference, of course, 
faced the same lack of adjudicative guidance and were themselves the 
product of reference to other settlements, so that ultimately, to para-
250 Moreover, once the defendants reach the settlement table, they focus on loss 
causation and damages, not fraud.  While loss causation and damages might be “mer-
its” factors in an economic model of settlement, when most people ask whether the 
merits matter, we understand them to be taking the narrow perspective that focuses on 
the elements of liability.  They are asking the basic question of whether or not there 
was fraud. 
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phrase the classic formulation of the problem of infinite regress, “it’s 
settlements all the way down.”251
Decisions on a motion to dismiss do, of course, constitute adjudi-
cation, and those decisions determine whether or not a case will settle.  
For this reason, we cannot—and do not—contend that there is no ad-
judication.  Rather, we simply observe that there is little or no adjudi-
cation beyond the motion to dismiss and, as a result, the parties have 
little guidance concerning the merits of their claims in the settlement 
process.  With more adjudication—particularly through trials—the 
weight of basic facts in establishing liability would become a matter of 
precedent and the likelihood of success on the merits with regard to a 
variety of basic fact patterns would be known.  Of equal importance, 
the details of competing damages models would be tested by neutral 
arbiters, leading to a body of precedent in which certain approaches 
to damages would be rejected.  With greater guidance on the weight 
of basic facts and the credibility of various approaches to measuring 
damages, it would be possible to create more reliable models of both 
the probability of success and the likely cost of damages.  The world of 
securities litigation, in other words, could begin to resemble the 
model of civil litigation propounded by legal academics.252
Nevertheless, how one achieves the goal of more adjudication is, 
to say the least, problematic.  An attempt to achieve this goal through 
a rule barring settlement of securities claims would likely have nega-
251 “It’s turtles all the way down” is a classic formulation of the problem of infinite 
regress, the essential problem created by basing settlement upon settlement without a 
solid foundation of adjudicated fact.  Stephen Hawking refers to the problem in a par-
able about a scientist giving a lecture on the nature and origin of the galaxy: 
At the end of the lecture, a little old lady at the back of the room got up and 
said:  “What you have told us is rubbish.  The world is really a flat plate sup-
ported on the back of a giant tortoise.”  The scientist gave a superior smile be-
fore replying, “What is the tortoise standing on?”  “You’re very clever, young 
man, very clever,” said the old lady.  “But it’s turtles all the way down!” 
STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 1 (1988).  Justice Scalia offers an-
other version of the story: 
[A]n Eastern guru affirms that the earth is supported on the back of a tiger.  
When asked what supports the tiger, he says it stands upon an elephant; and 
when asked what supports the elephant he says it is a giant turtle.  When 
asked, finally, what supports the giant turtle, he is briefly taken aback, but 
quickly replies “Ah, after that it is turtles all the way down.” 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 754 n.14 (2006). 
252 See supra text accompanying note 106. 
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tive consequences.253  For any pair of litigants, the costs of going to 
trial will almost certainly be greater than the benefits of additional ad-
judication (otherwise, there would be no need to require them to ad-
judicate).254  Moreover, if the goal of forcing more adjudication is to 
better guide parties through settlement, prohibiting settlement en-
tirely would have the paradoxical effect of destroying the benefit of 
more adjudication.  What we need, it seems, is a rule that creates some
additional adjudication, not one that requires every case to be decided 
by summary judgment or trial.255
What rule could create more adjudication without requiring every 
case to go to summary judgment and, if necessary, trial?  Imagine a 
lottery system that prohibited five or ten percent of all securities class 
actions from settling after surviving the motion to dismiss.256  These 
253 Rosenberg and Shavell have proposed a new rule giving defendants the option
to “have courts declare that settlement agreements will not be enforced” as a way of 
preventing nuisance suits in class actions.  See David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A So-
lution to the Problem of Nuisance Suits:  The Option to Have the Court Bar Settlement, 26 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 42, 42 (2006).  While innovative and promising, this new rule is not 
intended to promote additional adjudication, but rather to reduce the number of nui-
sance claims. 
254 This is a collective action problem:  all litigants would prefer to negotiate set-
tlement in an environment of more adjudication, but no litigants want to be forced to 
adjudicate their dispute.  The social benefit requires great individual sacrifice by some.  
All individuals would prefer to free-ride, with the result that the social benefit of more 
adjudication does not arise.  See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE 
ACTION (1971) (describing the free-rider problem). 
255 Kozel and Rosenberg have proposed a rule that would bar settlement before 
summary judgment.  See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value 
Settlement Problem:  Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1860 (2004).  This 
rule would produce more adjudication and, for the reasons that they provide, it would 
be a superior way to weed out nuisance claims over precertification merits review.  
Nevertheless, our intuition is that this rule will be rejected as too expensive and too 
restrictive.  See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
522 (2007) (suggesting that summary judgment is expensive and that our civil justice 
system would function better without such a requirement). 
256 The lottery system responds to the collective action problem by changing the 
effective ex ante bargain among all prospective litigants.  Now, when filing a claim, all 
litigants should do so understanding that there is a 5% or 10% chance (whatever level 
is chosen by the lottery system) that their claim will be chosen for adjudication rather 
than settlement.  They should therefore factor the cost of adjudication, discounted by 
the probability of not being selected in the lottery, into the value of their claim when 
they file.  In this way, viewed from an ex ante perspective, the lottery system distributes 
the cost of extra adjudication across all claims even though it is ultimately borne by 
only a few.  See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE: ON LOTTERIES AND LEGAL DECI-
SION-MAKING 145 (1999) (“[T]he use of randomizing techniques in legal contexts may 
have positive effects on people’s incentives and might also, on occasions, turn out to be 
cost-efficient and (more controversially) just.”).
826 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 755
cases could only be resolved through adjudication—either summary 
judgment or trial—or by the voluntary dismissal of a case with no 
payment from the defendants.  We can imagine a wide variety of ob-
jections to such a lottery.257  But perhaps the most damning is that the 
number of securities class actions is too small for us to be confident 
that subjecting a small random sample of cases to the no-settlement 
rule would lead to adjudication that would answer the most pressing 
open questions.  Many claims subjected to the rule would almost cer-
tainly be dropped by the plaintiffs’ law firms for the simple reason that 
having to pursue a claim all the way through to adjudication (as op-
posed to settlement) may well make the claim a negative-net-present-
value investment, and their firms’ resources may be best deployed on 
other claims that have not been selected for adjudication.258  With 
many of the claims selected for adjudication thus abandoned,259 the 
lottery rule may fail to produce much in the way of useful law.  More 
basically, because settlement is, quite sensibly, a favored outcome of 
civil litigation,260 it is highly unlikely that policymakers would seriously 
257 Some, for example, might raise a moral objection that lotteries are an inappro-
priate means of deciding rights.  See, e.g., id. at 87-88 (noting that the use of a lottery 
may run counter to traditional notions of justice).  We tend to disagree.  See Tom 
Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law:  An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV.
443, 482-83 (2004) (identifying and responding to moral objections to using uncer-
tainty to promote deterrence in criminal and civil law).  But the likelihood of a poli-
cymaker adopting a trial-lottery system seems sufficiently unlikely for us to treat these 
arguments and their answers as beyond the scope of this project. 
258 From the plaintiffs’ lawyer’s point of view, settling a securities class action is 
probably a positive-net-present-value investment much more often than trying the ac-
tion.  Trials are expensive, and when suddenly faced with the additional costs of trial 
without a concomitant rise in the expected value of a claim, plaintiffs’ lawyers are likely 
to drop the case.  Dropped claims, of course, are not the objective of the lottery system, 
but it is likely impossible to avoid this outcome.  Even were we to try such a rule, ra-
tional lawyers would likely respond by simply stopping work on the claim, ceasing to 
invest in the claim and ceding an early dismissal.  Because there is probably no effi-
cient means of monitoring the effort that plaintiffs’ lawyers put into litigating their 
case, any such rule designed to force adjudication seems destined to fail.  It is worth 
noting that, for Rosenberg and Shavell, the whole point of crafting rules in this area is 
to induce plaintiffs’ lawyers to abandon cases that are not worth taking to trial.  See
Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 253, at 44-46. 
259 We also note that the cases most likely to be abandoned are those that are also 
most likely to produce useful precedent in adjudication—meaning those cases making 
unclear or unusual factual allegations and those making use of controversial damages 
models.
260 See generally Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073-
74 (1984) (describing how settlement has become an explicit pre-trial process); Gary 
M. Fournier & Thomas W. Zuehlke, Litigation and Settlement:  An Empirical Approach, 71 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 189 (1989) (demonstrating that decisions of litigants to settle arise 
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consider a rule that forced the parties to litigate through to adjudica-
tion, even in a small sample of cases.  We are therefore not hopeful 
that a rule can be designed that will require more adjudication.  Never-
theless, we are hopeful that two reforms that we have previously advo-
cated could increase the information value of settlements and, per-
haps, increase adjudication. 
B.  More Disclosure 
In the area of securities law especially, disclosure rules are a com-
mon alternative to mandatory rules.  We have advocated additional 
disclosure concerning D&O insurance before.  Griffith has argued for 
mandatory disclosure of D&O insurance policies’ details—including a 
corporate insured’s total limits, structure of coverage, and total policy 
premium—as a proxy for corporate governance risk.261  And both of 
us have argued that without such disclosure, the deterrence value of 
shareholder litigation may well be lost.262  Here we advance a similar 
argument, advocating mandatory disclosure of (1) the amount and 
structure of a corporation’s insurance coverage, and (2) information 
on how settlement and defense costs are funded. 
Current regulations require virtually no disclosure regarding 
D&O insurance.263  Corporations may disclose that they have pur-
chased D&O insurance, but they are not required to disclose any de-
tails about their coverage.264  In seeking to make settlements more de-
from characteristics of our legal system); Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, 
For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1660-65 (1985) (responding to Fiss’s article and 
expounding the benefits of alternative dispute resolution). 
261 Griffith, supra note 8, at 1150-51.  Others have drawn similar conclusions.  See,
e.g., John E. Core, On the Corporate Demand for Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance, 64 J. RISK
& INS. 63, 68 (1997) (arguing that liability risk drives the decision to obtain D&O in-
surance); cf. Martin Boyer, Is the Demand for Corporate Insurance a Habit?  Evidence of Or-
ganizational Inertia from Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance 19 (CIRANO, Working Paper 
No. 2004s-33, 2004) (noting the possible moral hazard behind D&O insurance, and 
positing that demand will be higher at some companies for a reason). 
262 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 488-89 (observing that D&O insurance 
casts liability to a third party, making deterrence contingent upon insurer practices 
such as monitoring governance practices). 
263 See Griffith, supra note 8, at 1190-1200 (describing the legal rules affecting dis-
closure of D&O insurance information). 
264 Public companies issuing shares under Form S-11 are required to disclose the 
existence and “general effect” of insurance programs, including D&O insurance.  See
17 C.F.R. § 229.702 (2008); SEC Form S-11, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
about/forms/forms-11.pdf (requiring a statement that the management is adequately 
insured).  Not only is this disclosure of the “general effect” of D&O insurance not de-
tailed enough to be useful, but it only appears in corporate filings in connection with 
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pendent on merit, we believe that corporations should be made to 
disclose their limits and the structure of coverage. 
Currently, settlement amounts are matters of public record.  And 
indeed, we discovered that industry sources track individual settle-
ments in securities litigation265 and also aggregate these settlements to 
discern trends in settlement.266  Publicly disclosed settlement data, 
however, currently lack systematic information on how individual set-
tlements are funded.  Perhaps most importantly, we do not know what 
percentage of any given settlement is funded by insurance versus 
funded by the corporation itself.  We also do not know what addi-
tional amounts, beyond the total settlement, were spent in defense of 
the claim. 
Combining insurance data with settlement and defense data 
would create a number of useful comparisons and would improve our 
ability to assess the impact of the merits on settlement values.  Com-
paring settlement amounts to the limits and program structure would 
be useful both to evaluate the impact of insurance on settlement val-
ues in general, and to develop a sophisticated understanding of the 
meaning of individual settlements.267  If, as we suspect, both insurance 
limits and insurance-program structure shape settlements, then indi-
the issuance of shares.  Disclosure is not required even after the occurrence of a sig-
nificant event such as a policy renewal or a noticed claim.  If it were required on a 
regular periodic basis, analysts would be able to track changes. 
265 The PLUS Journal, a trade publication for the Professional Liability Underwrit-
ing Society, publishes statistics on recent settlements, including date of settlement and 
total settlement amount, in each monthly issue.  See, e.g., PLUS Case Reviews, PLUS J.,
Oct. 2008, at 10; see also Stanford Law Sch. & Cornerstone Research, Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse, http://securities.stanford.edu/settle.html (last visited Jan. 15, 
2009) (providing news of securities settlements since 1999). 
266 See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, supra note 38 (aggregating securities class action 
case filings); see also FOSTER ET AL., supra note 72, at 1 (analyzing trends and predicting 
that settlement sizes might not increase in the near future). 
267 For example, all other things being equal, a $150 million settlement paid by the 
insurers of a defendant with a $100 million D&O program represents a stronger case 
for the plaintiffs than a $150 million settlement paid by the insurers of a defendant 
with a $200 million D&O program.  At the lower end of the settlement range, we sus-
pect that, all other things being equal, a $5 million settlement that is funded by the $4 
million left in the primary policy after paying defense costs plus $1 million from the 
first layer excess carrier is a weaker case for plaintiffs than a $5 million dollar settle-
ment funded entirely by a primary carrier that sold a $10 million policy.  In addition, a 
settlement amount within limits that is nevertheless partially funded by the company 
itself may suggest more merit-related elements in the claim—for example, grounds for 
a potential rescission threat that caused the defendant corporation to contribute its 
own resources to fund settlement. 
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vidual settlements could be better interpreted if the limits and struc-
ture were disclosed. 
Disclosure of this information is vital if securities litigation is to 
have a deterrent effect.  The disclosure of this information would en-
able market participants to draw conclusions about the likelihood that 
defendants had engaged in bad acts.  With the current opacity of set-
tlement data, it is common to encounter the view in the market that 
securities lawsuits typically lack merit and are simply the product of 
greedy plaintiffs’ lawyers.268  If better information about settlement 
was available, capital-market participants could develop a more nu-
anced view regarding which securities claims are likely to be meritori-
ous and, more importantly, which corporations are likely to have en-
gaged in bad acts.  Those that have engaged in bad acts may find their 
share prices facing a deeper discount and thus corporations may be-
come susceptible to takeover offers or other market constraints.269
Disclosure, in other words, is a necessary prerequisite to allowing 
the market to carry the deterrence signal of corporate and securities 
litigation.  Because the cost of litigation is funded by insurance, the 
strength of this signal is severely diminished.  Without a market 
mechanism to deliver the signal, it may be lost altogether.  Without 
268 See Jenny Anderson, Lawyer Leaving Firm to Focus on Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 
2007, at C2 (“Critics [of Milberg Weiss] contended that many of the lawsuits were frivo-
lous, raising the cost of doing business and delivering little or nothing to aggrieved 
parties.”); Julie Creswell, One Route Seems Closed, So Lawyers Try Different Lawsuit in Stock-
Option Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, at C4 (“Many derivative lawsuits are nothing 
more than efforts by attorneys who are motivated by the desire to generate fees.” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a defense lawyer from Sullivan & Crom-
well)); Julie Creswell, U.S. Indictment for Big Law Firm in Class Actions, N.Y. TIMES, May 
19, 2006, at A1 (“Its lucrative business made Millberg Weiss a target for political critics 
who saw the firm as a symbol of a national litigation industry that had gone out of con-
trol.  These critics said that many of the firm’s lawsuits against corporations were frivo-
lous, raising the cost of doing business.”); Timothy L. O’Brien & Jonathan D. Glater, 
Robin Hoods or Legal Hoods?  The Government Takes Aim at a Class-Action Powerhouse, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2005, § 3, at 1 (“To critics, the lawyers [at Milberg Weiss] embody what 
they say is amiss with modern class action suits:  shifty and belligerent legal tactics, ex-
cessive paydays for lawyers and repeated blackmailing of straight-arrow corporations.”); 
Patty Waldmeir, Supreme Court Curbs Actions Against Companies, FIN. TIMES (U.S. & Can. 
ed.), June 22, 2007, at 13 (reporting that corporate America hopes that the recent 
Tellabs decision will reduce frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation). 
269 Wrongdoers may, for example, be unable to obtain debt or equity financing on 
the same terms.  On the ability of markets and other nonlegal norms to sanction cor-
porate actors, see Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power:  
Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1645 (2001), 
concluding that “[w]hen markets are sufficiently competitive, a firm with suboptimal 
[nonlegal rules and standards] will be driven out of business.” 
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disclosure, in other words, corporate and securities litigation will not 
deter.  And, if policymakers are unwilling to adopt the disclosure 
mechanism, they might as well abolish corporate and securities litiga-
tion altogether since, without deterrence, it is essentially a waste. 
C.  Less Entity-Level D&O Insurance 
In prior work, we questioned the value of entity-level D&O insur-
ance protection for shareholders, based on our finding that D&O in-
surance is pure risk-spreading insurance that does not provide moni-
toring services to the corporations and therefore creates moral 
hazard.270  The cloud that D&O insurance casts on the role of the mer-
its in the settlement of securities class actions provides yet another 
reason to question the value of entity-level protection.  According to 
our participants, the amount and structure of the corporate defen-
dant’s D&O insurance affects the settlement value of securities class 
actions in the ways that we described in Part III.B of this Article, 
thereby reducing the impact of the merits on the settlement amounts. 
Eliminating the entity-level protection would mean that the cor-
porate defendant’s assets would be at stake in every securities class ac-
tion settlement, increasing the corporation’s incentive to contest the 
amount of the settlement from the ground up and eliminating the 
ability of the corporation to cooperate with the plaintiffs to obtain a 
fully insured settlement.  Eliminating entity-level coverage would re-
sult in what is referred to in the industry as “pure Side A coverage,” 
which pays only when a corporation is unable to indemnify its officers 
and directors—either because the corporation is insolvent or the cor-
poration’s bylaws or applicable law prohibit indemnification of the di-
rectors or officers.  As we explained, corporations generally are legally 
permitted, and typically required by their bylaws, to indemnify their 
officers and directors for the amounts paid to settle securities class ac-
tions.  As a result, a solvent corporation with only a pure Side A policy 
would fully fund a securities class action settlement involving its direc-
tors and officers.  If nothing else, that would give the corporation a 
greater stake in contesting the merits, and, at least with solvent corpo-
270 Baker & Griffith, supra note 24, at 1841.  Our term “entity-level coverage” in-
cludes both the Side C coverage that is referred to in the industry as “entity coverage” 
and Side B coverage.  Side B coverage indemnifies the corporation for the corpora-
tion’s obligation to indemnify its officers and directors.  Side C coverage indemnifies 
the corporation for its own liability in securities actions.  Both Side C and Side B cov-
erage protect corporate assets, not the assets of the individual directors and officers.  
Thus, both raise the corporate-insurance issues that we analyzed in prior work. 
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rations, it would eliminate the complicated effect that D&O insurance 
has on the role of the merits in settlement negotiations. 
CONCLUSION
This Article is the culmination of our research on the relationship 
between D&O insurance and corporate governance.  Looking back on 
the project as a whole, we must ultimately arrive at a fairly pessimistic 
conclusion about the ability of liability rules to deter bad corporate 
conduct.  Agreeing with most scholars that securities class actions do 
not effectively serve the objective of compensating investors for loss,271
our work provides reason to doubt that securities class actions serve a 
meaningful deterrence objective. 
Although some factors influencing the settlement of securities 
class actions are arguably merit related—such as the “sex appeal” of 
the facts supporting the liability elements—settlement also depends 
on factors that clearly are not merit related—such as insurance policy 
structure and limits, as well as the business exigencies of the corporate 
defendant and the incentives of the lawyers.  Moreover, in the absence 
of adjudication beyond the motion to dismiss, parties settling securi-
ties class actions have no guide apart from other settlements, which 
are opaque and subject to the same set of nonmeritorious distortions. 
Joining the insights of this Article to our prior research, the dis-
torting effect of D&O insurance becomes clear.  Not only does insur-
ance cloud the question of merit, but insurance also significantly re-
duces the deterrent effect of securities litigation, quite simply, by 
paying for it.  Insurers do seek to price their product to risk, but, as we 
explained in the first Article of the trilogy, the mere fact of buying in-
surance at a marginally higher price, without disclosure of the price 
paid, is not likely to deter corporate actors.272  Because, as we explored 
in the second Article, insurers do very little to monitor the behavior of 
their corporate insureds during the life of the policy,273 the deterrence 
payoff must come, if at all, in settlement.  However, as we have argued 
here, insurance introduces distortions into the settlement process that 
insurers are largely unable (or unwilling) to cure.  As a result, private 
271 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 25, at 1536. 
272 Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 533-37 (discussing various mechanisms that 
make liability fees fall evenly on good and bad firms, undermining deterrence effects). 
273 Baker & Griffith, supra note 24, at 1807-13 (summarizing empirical data about 
insurers’ failure to provide loss-prevention services). 
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securities litigation, at least as the system is currently administered, is 
unlikely to deter bad corporate actors. 
Disclosure, we have repeatedly argued, would be an important 
step in improving the situation.274  Capital-market participants could 
promote deterrence, but in order to do so they need to know the de-
tails of insurance pricing, insurance programs, and securities settle-
ments.  Because securities litigation thus fails to deter without such 
disclosures, it behooves the SEC—the agency charged with promulgat-
ing both liability rules and disclosure rules—to either amend its dis-
closure rules to introduce these additional requirements (and thereby 
reinvigorate the deterrence function of securities litigation) or, failing 
that, to eliminate the wastefulness of the current system of liability 
rules. 
274 See generally Baker & Griffith, supra note 8, at 536-37 (“[A] corporation’s D&O 
premium, if disclosed, would reveal valuable information . . . to capital market partici-
pants.”); Griffith, supra note 8, at 1203-07 (“The law should be changed to require dis-
closure of more details concerning a company’s D&O policies.”). 
